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[J]ust as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some earlier creature to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive in the law long after
the use they once served is at an end and the reason for them has been forgotten. The result of following them must often be failure and confusion from the
merely logical point of view.
—O. W. HOLMES, JR.
THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881)
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
—O. W. Holmes
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
Perhaps the adage about hard cases making bad law should be revised to cover
easy cases.
—Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 640 n.*
(Stevens, J., concurring)
INTRODUCTION
Personal jurisdiction has long been at the center of the civil procedure curriculum in law school1 and constitutes an important part of law practice.2 Ser1

Some civil procedure faculty report spending as many as six to eight weeks of class time
covering personal jurisdiction. Many prominent Civil Procedure casebooks devote 100 pages
or more to the topic and excerpt as many as a dozen personal jurisdiction cases, as well as
presenting extensive notes on personal jurisdiction cases. See, e.g., DAVID CRUMP ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 49–117 (6th ed. 2012) (sixty-eight pages and
twenty-four excerpted cases addressing personal jurisdiction); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 71–198 (10th ed. 2009) (127 pages and twentytwo excerpted cases); RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH
680–824 (5th ed. 2009) (144 pages and fourteen excerpted cases on personal jurisdiction);
STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 680–846
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vice of process, a close companion, receives considerably less attention in the
law school curriculum,3 but it is perhaps even more important to the daily practice of law.4
The amount of class time devoted to personal jurisdiction is so great (and
perhaps excessive) because it lends itself so well the traditional modified Socratic method of the classroom. Changing the facts just a little forces students
to confront the problems of concrete application of doctrine—for example,
“What if the defendant had intentionally shipped ten widgets into the forum
state instead of ten thousand?”
The law of personal jurisdiction also presents an opportunity to teach civil
procedure as legal process, as courts traverse from the territorial sovereignty
and international law concepts of Pennoyer5 to the minimum contacts of International Shoe6 to the more involved modern applications of World-Wide

(4th ed. 2012) (166 pages and fourteen excerpted cases addressing personal jurisdiction). But
see RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND QUESTIONS 21–142 (6th ed. 2012) (devotes 121 pages of consideration to personal jurisdiction but excerpts only nine cases); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL
PROCEDURE 76–122 (2013) (devoting forty-six pages to the topic and excerpting only two
cases). Although extensive, multi-week attention to personal jurisdiction may be excessive in
relation to the importance of the topic in ordinary litigation, some instructors arguably go to
the other extreme, covering the subject in a class period or less simply by setting forth controlling doctrine in the area. See also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE
SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 5–6
(1986) (concluding that U.S. Supreme Court devotes too much attention to personal jurisdiction cases and notwithstanding this investment of time has failed to provide clear guidance in
the area to lower courts).
2
Genuinely difficult issues of personal jurisdiction akin to those presented in law school
casebooks are relatively rare in practice. Most lawyers correctly elect to sue only in states
where the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. But this still reflects substantial attorney planning as to the range of available forums as well as a decision as to the most
advantageous forum. Further, even with lawyers attempting to avoid suit in a forum without
jurisdiction, successful Rule 12(b)(2) motions, although comparatively rare, are still a frequent and important aspect of civil litigation.
3
In most civil procedure casebooks, service of process gets comparatively little attention.
See, e.g., FREER & PERDUE, supra note 1, at 143–62 (nineteen pages and two excerpted cases
on service); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, 199–238 (thirty-nine pages and four cases on
service); MARCUS ET AL., supra note 1, 825–49 (twenty-four pages and two cases on service); SUBRIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 828–30 (three pages and one case addressing service of
process). But see CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 118–30 (only twelve pages but six cases
presented); STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 118–23 (specifically addressing service of process and personal jurisdiction), 123–48 (specifically addressing service of process as a matter of notice and due process).
4
Although the average lawsuit does not involve serious questions regarding personal jurisdiction, all lawsuits require effective service of process to commence the action. Although
this aspect of litigation is less intellectually interesting and more technical, formal, and rote,
in the typical case it probably consumes more resources than analysis of personal jurisdiction.
5
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
6
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Volkswagen,7 Helicopteros,8 Burger King,9 Keeton v. Hustler,10 Calder v.
Jones,11 Asahi Metal,12 J. McIntyre,13 Goodyear,14 and, most recently, Daimler15 and Walden v. Fiore.16
As society changed, doctrine changed; as the law, society, and business
further evolved, so did doctrine, arguably moving from an excessively restrictive attitude toward jurisdictional reach17 to one overly permissive,18 only to
retreat somewhat in response to perceived abuses or unforeseen problems.19
Students can be shown a history of judicial attitudes toward litigation and fairness reflected in case law. Although the availability of personal jurisdiction
generally expanded in response to the felt necessities of the time20 (the International Shoe line of cases),21 courts also put limits on at least one venerable form
of jurisdiction and lawyer tool (quasi-in-rem jurisdiction) that became viewed
as too fraught with potential for unfairness (Shaffer v. Heitner).22
7

World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
9
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
10
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
11
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
12
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
13
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
14
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
15
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
16
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
17
For example, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) appears to grant very broad personal
jurisdiction over persons or property within the territorial boundaries of the state but to deny
jurisdiction even in the compelling cases in which defendants enter a state, do harm, but then
leave the state before they can be served with legal process. Cases between Pennoyer and
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), expanded personal jurisdiction concepts
to reach such cases but did so only narrowly based on fairly confined notions of whether the
defendant, even if not physically present in the state at the time of suit, had been “doing
business” in the state. See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 83–89.
18
See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1958) (upholding California’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Texas-based insurance company that acquired another
insurer that had sold a single policy in California, albeit to the plaintiff’s decedent). Because
the McGee defendant’s contact with California is so closely related to the gravamen of the
lawsuit (refusal of the insurer to pay policy benefits to a beneficiary), I have always regarded
the case as correctly decided even though the defendant’s quantum of contact with the forum
state is slim. But almost all commentators agree that McGee is the Supreme Court’s most
extensive exercise of personal jurisdiction.
19
See infra notes 155–88 and accompanying text (discussing constriction of broad personal
jurisdiction by Supreme Court).
20
See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (law responds to “felt necessities of
the time”). The Holmes gift for turning a phrase, like Shakespeare’s, has become so much a
part of the legal lexicon that what might be termed Holmes-isms come unconsciously to
lawyers. See id. (“The life of the law has not been logic. It has been experience.” This quote
is another aphorism that explains a good deal of the development of personal jurisdiction).
21
See supra notes 5–16 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
22
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1977), discussed infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text.
8
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Service of process, by contrast, tends to get short shrift in the classroom
because it is perhaps unfairly viewed as more mechanical, better suited for onthe-job learning, and less conducive to class discussion. While lacking in Socratic potential, service of process can provide some useful comic relief to
overwrought law students. Consider the problems of “sewer service” by unscrupulous process servers.23 Or the challenge of bird-dogging the defendant
trying to avoid service as the limitations period nears expiration, complete with
inventive process servers lurking behind bushes, including the summons and
complaint with the morning paper, tossing these papers through a window
while wrapped around a rock, and so on. Even if such service might not actually hold up in the face of a Rule 12(b)(5) challenge,24 the examples provide useful anecdotes or illustrations for the classroom.25
But in these instances of tenacious service of the reluctant defendant, there
is usually no question that the defendant is subject to suit in the relevant jurisdiction. In most real life litigation, there is little connection between service of
process—a technical, mechanical, bureaucratic necessity—and personal jurisdiction, as well as no serious issue regarding the existence of personal jurisdiction. Consequently, classroom illustrations about “slap” service26 done in Charlie Chaplin or Keystone Cops mode usually function as amusing illustrations of
a means of giving notice rather than a means of acquiring jurisdiction.
An exception, of course, arises when service is effectuated while the prospective defendant is merely passing through the relevant jurisdiction. Such
“transient” or “tag” jurisdiction became seemingly out of place with the International Shoe decision, given its focus on whether the defendant had sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state of the lawsuit to make litigation against
23

Sewer service is an informal term frequently used to describe service that is allegedly
done (usually with an unscrupulous process server’s affidavit in support) but was never in
fact completed, with the process frequently ending up discarded (in the metaphorical sewer)
rather than actually given to the prospective defendant or agent. See FREER & PERDUE, supra
note 1, at 161.
24
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5) (motion to dismiss complaint may be based on improper or
inadequate service of process plaintiff); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4) (motion to dismiss may also
be based on defective form or content of summons).
25
Perhaps my favorite involves a staffer at the law firm where I once worked who was seeking to serve a reluctant target, a working physician. The staffer came to the medical office
professing a need to see Dr. X. When asked whether he was a patient, the staffer replied that
the doctor was “very familiar with my case.” The staffer, a distinguished older man and retired court clerk, was ushered into an examination room and served the doctor when he subsequently entered the room.
26
In this this article, I will use the term “slap service” as well as “tag” jurisdiction and
“transient” jurisdiction to refer to instances in which a defendant served with a summons and
complaint as a means of initiating litigation. This type of physical, in-person service also
connotes ambushing a defendant who, if not unwilling to accept process, is at least surprised
by the sudden nature of the service. Tag jurisdiction is a more common term referring to
such cases where a defendant temporarily in the forum state is “tagged” with process in the
manner of being tagged as “it” in the familiar children’s game. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant in transit through a jurisdiction through service of process is perhaps even more commonly referred to as transient jurisdiction.
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the defendant in that state consistent with fair place and substantive justice under the Due Process Clause.27 This tension became particularly palpable after
Shaffer v. Heitner.28
The argument against the continuing vitality of service to establish personal jurisdiction is a powerful one—that mere service is not a very weighty contact with the forum state and should not, by itself, establish the requisite minimum contacts required by International Shoe and its progeny. For example, a
Philadelphian may drive to Southern Ohio to drop off a child at college using
Interstate 70, which passes through a sliver of West Virginia wedged between
Pennsylvania and Ohio. If the Pennsylvanian is served while gassing up the car
at a truck stop near Wheeling, can this really subject the Philadelphian to a lawsuit in West Virginia? Even for a lawsuit over events having no connection to
West Virginia? The common sense answer under a minimum contacts/fairness
analysis is that, without more, this slim amount of contact with the forum state
cannot make it fair to subject this transient driver to a lawsuit in West Virginia
over a dispute centered elsewhere.
This hypothetical can easily be made more unfair if the college drop-off
trip does not involve a litigation forum state adjacent to the defendant’s own
domicile. Consider, for example, a Californian who flies to Pittsburgh, rents a
car, and then drives to Ohio, being served at the Wheeling truck stop in a lawsuit involving a real estate dispute in Florida. Should the Californian really
have to defend himself in a West Virginia court? And what if service were effectuated by a former Navy Seal who, while suspended from a helicopter keeping pace with the Californian on a West Virginia stretch of I-70, induces the
driver to roll down the window and then hands the summons through the window?
If the Philadelphian or Californian is involved in an automobile collision in
West Virginia on such a trip, the questions of contact and fairness are, of
course, quite different. The defendant has now had substantial, palpable, injurious contact with the forum state in connection with a matter related to the lawsuit. Only the most restrictive of pre-International Shoe courts would deny personal jurisdiction in such cases. But providing what is essentially general
personal jurisdiction over any defendant with the misfortune of being served
while in the forum state, however briefly or episodically, was always hard to
square with the due process fairness approach of International Shoe.
At least as an intellectual endeavor, continuing to treat slap service as establishing general personal jurisdiction because the defendant was “tagged”
with process while briefly in the forum state became increasingly difficult after

27

See supra notes 5–16 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text, discussing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977) and scholarly reaction to the decision.
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Shaffer v. Heitner.29 In Shaffer, the Court required that another venerable jurisdictional gambit—quasi-in-rem jurisdiction30—comport with the minimum
contacts approach of International Shoe. If quasi-in-rem jurisdiction must satisfy the minimum contacts/due process test, then surely the same would logically
be required of slap service and transient jurisdiction absent extenuating circumstances.31
29

See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210–12 (1977), discussed infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text.
30
Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is the attachment of a defendant’s property in the state as a
means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Even if the defendant is not otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction, through quasi-in-rem personal jurisdiction, the defendant can be sued in the state of attachment—even over matters unrelated to the property—but any judgment against the defendant cannot exceed the value of the attached properproperty. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 107–08 (6th ed. 2011).
31
Although this article argues for the elimination of tag jurisdiction as a general matter, I
concede that there may be a place for continued use of service to establish personal jurisdiction in cases where a defendant would otherwise avoid justice. For example, if there is no
practical alternative forum for suing a defendant (e.g., a foreign dictator who seldom leaves
his military compound) that has caused injury but is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction (discussed infra notes 52–62 and accompanying text), upholding personal jurisdiction
while serving the dictator at an airport, seaport, or vacation hotel may be justified as necessary to vindicating substantive legal rights. This type of jurisdiction-by-necessity-for-justice
thinking may undergird modern cases that exercise tag jurisdiction without much seeming
reflection on the potential unfairness of such exercises of jurisdiction or its inconsistency
with the minimum contacts construct. See, e.g..DGLFY.DUDGåLü)G G&LU
1995) (upholding personal jurisdiction in Alien Tort Claims Act cases on basis of service
during U.S. visit over alleged ringleader of atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina) (citing Burnham); Bourassa v. Desrochers, 938 F.2d 1056, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding service of
process during Florida trip sufficient for exercise of personal jurisdiction over Canadian citizen accused of fraud); Schinkel v. Maxi-Holding, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 1219, 1222–23 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1991) (asserting personal jurisdiction over Finland resident on Massachusetts vacation) (embracing Scalia’s position in Burnham). But outside the topic of human rights abuses
(for example, the Kadic court noted that suit in the former Yugoslavia was not a realistic option, 70 F.3d at 250), in almost any such hypothetical one can create, it would also seem possible to sue the defendant in at least one forum related to the underlying lawsuit, which
would permit long-arm specific personal jurisdiction that eliminates the need for tag jurisdiction. For example in Bourassa v. Desrochers, the defendant solicited the business of plaintiff, a California resident, through calls to her home and that purportedly swindled her into
paying for land that defendant misappropriated for profit, causing injury to plaintiff in her
home state of California. 938 F.2d at 1057. Less clearly, in Schinkel v. Maxi-Holding, the
defendant appears to have reached out to contract with the Massachusetts based plaintiff and
then caused harm to plaintiff felt in Massachusetts (but the court did not discuss the defendant’s contacts in any detail because it was content to base personal jurisdiction on service
alone). 565 N.E.2d at 1221. Although the Supreme Court’s most recent specific personal jurisdiction case of Walden v. Fiore may prompt some doubt (see infra notes 183–88 and accompanying text), it would seem that there is no due process bar to exercises of jurisdiction
in Bourassa and Schinkel (although state long-arm statutes may not be satisfied). To the extent this analysis is incorrect, it may indicate that Walden v. Fiore is more problematic than
has been appreciated to date. Just the same, it would seem that defendants outside a forum
state that intentionally cause injury within the forum state should logically be subject to personal jurisdiction irrespective of whether physical service of process takes place. Further, in
real world litigation, a bigger problem with such elusive defendants will not be obtaining
personal jurisdiction (e.g., the dictator’s bodyguards rough up plaintiff and plaintiff sues in
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Or so one would have thought. In the Court’s subsequent decision in Burnham v. Superior Court,32 however, the plurality opinion embraced the continued efficacy of tag jurisdiction—on the basis of historical use alone—arguably
giving tag jurisdiction or slap service higher status than quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, even though the latter is at least as defensible as the former. But, as discussed below,33 such a reading of Burnham is overbroad in light of the fractured nature of the Court and hedged rhetoric in that case. Nonetheless, for reareasons that are both puzzling and troubling, many commentators and courts
writing after Burnham have largely treated Justice Scalia’s opinion as broadly
endorsing tag jurisdiction as black letter law even though it only commanded
three votes. Arguably, the opinion garnered four votes, in that Justice White’s
concurrence was generally supportive of tag jurisdiction but open to subjecting
it to greater scrutiny if it proved problematic.34 A closer reading of Burnham
makes clear that a majority of the modern Supreme Court has never endorsed
service alone as conclusively establishing general personal jurisdiction in the
absence of some additional significant defendant contact with the forum state.
Both the judiciary’s overenthusiastic overreading of Burnham and the tension between slap service or tag jurisdiction, minimum contacts analysis, and
due process have become even more pronounced in the wake of the Court’s recent decisions in Goodyear35 and Daimler.36 In these two cases, the Court narrowed the availability of general personal jurisdiction, essentially making such
jurisdiction easily available only in a defendant’s home state (or home states in
the case of defendants who can be said to be “at home” in more than one state).
To the extent Burnham is incorrectly read as making service of process the
equivalent of general personal jurisdiction, this twenty-five-year-old precedent
is completely inconsistent with the solicitude expressed for general jurisdiction
defendants in Goodyear and Daimler.
Part I of this article briefly reviews the history and modern jurisprudence of
transient jurisdiction via service of process on defendants. It sites this basis for
jurisdiction in the larger context of evolving judicial doctrine on personal jurisdiction from Pennoyer to the present. This article in particular looks at Grace v.
MacArthur37—perhaps the outer limit of use of service upon a transient (while
his home state where the roughing took place or the plaintiff continued to suffer injury) so
much as collecting on a judgment (e.g., the dictator may not have assets outside the state of
his military dominance).
32
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990), discussed infra notes 139–53 and
accompanying text.
33
See infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
34
See infra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
35
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011), discussed infra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.
36
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014), discussed infra notes 171–82 and
accompanying text.
37
Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 443 (E.D. Ark. 1959), discussed infra notes 90–
109 and accompanying text.
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on a plane flight over state airspace) to establish personal jurisdiction, and the
puzzling manner in which MacArthur has been and continues to be erroneously
treated as authoritative. Part II reviews Burnham and highlights what many
courts appear to have missed: Burnham did not make service alone sufficient
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction; Justice Scalia’s opinion should not be
treated as authoritative based on perceived concessions in Justice Brennan’s
concurrence; and a majority of the Court required something more than mere
service of process to support personal jurisdiction. Part III introduces into the
mix Goodyear and Daimler and illustrates how both the holdings and the reasonings of these cases make slap service (and the continuing vitality of MacArthur and the Scalia opinion in Burnham) untenable. The article concludes by
reiterating the scholarly community’s longstanding call for a more integrated
treatment of all personal jurisdiction questions that would be fairer and more
consistent than the present regime.
I.

JURISDICTION BY SERVICE ALONE: THE ROAD
TO MACARTHUR AND BURNHAM

A. From Territoriality to Minimum Contacts
Although tag jurisdiction is typically viewed as established procedure of
ancient origin (and of longstanding “pedigree,” to use the language of Justice
Scalia in endorsing its continued vitality in Burnham38), the most extensive legal scholarship on the topic has persuasively argued to the contrary. Professor
Albert Ehrenzweig’s review of historical precedent concluded that until Pennoyer v. Neff,39 courts focused primarily on whether the forum was an adequately convenient location for subjecting the defendant to a lawsuit.40
Pennoyer41 enshrined transient jurisdiction in America, wrongfully so in
Ehrenzweig’s view. By focusing on the territorial limits of the states’ judicial
38

Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
40
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 290–91 (1956). But see Rhonda Wasserman, The
Subpoena Power: Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REV. 37, 49–51 (1989) (appearing to
characterize pre-Pennoyer historical practice as consistent with Pennoyer). More important,
perhaps, in Burnham, Justice Scalia (and three other justices) appear to view slap service and
tag jurisdiction as well-established prior to Pennoyer. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604, 613–14 (1990), but Justice Brennan (also joined by three justices) embraced Ehrenzweig’s historical analysis as authoritative. See id. at 634.
41
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 714. Pennoyer was an ejectment action brought in federal court under the diversity jurisdiction. Pennoyer, the defendant in that action, held the land under a
deed purchased in a sheriff’s sale conducted to satisfy a judgment for attorney’s fees obtained against Neff in a previous action by one Mitchell. At the time of Mitchell’s suit in an
Oregon state court, Neff was a nonresident of Oregon. An Oregon statute allowed service by
publication on nonresidents with property in the State. Mitchell had used that procedure to
bring Neff before the court. The United States Circuit Court for the District of Oregon, in
which Neff brought his ejectment action, refused to recognize the validity of the judgment
39
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powers, Pennoyer both unduly limited a state’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant outside its borders and gave the state excessively
unbridled power over any defendant who could be physically found within state
borders.
Notwithstanding the obvious shortcomings and the virtually unanimous
criticism of the law of personal jurisdiction, efforts for judicial or legislative reform have been decisively impeded by the assumption, so forcefully supported
by the author of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, that our rules of personal
jurisdiction are of ancient common law origin. . . . [N]otwithstanding dogmatic
generalizations later sanctioned by the Restatement, appellate courts hardly ever
in fact held transient service sufficient as such. Indeed, courts apparently had
occasion only rarely to proceed upon such service, since state statutes, as yet
[prior to Pennoyer] unrestricted by constitutional demand, quite liberally permitted suits against absent defendants, leaving it to the courts to determine whether
they properly had jurisdiction in a given case. Forum conveniens—to use an unusual, but I believe helpful, phrase—was, in this sense, the basis of all personal
jurisdiction.
. . . Only when transient service, hitherto a harmless adjunct of convenient
jurisdiction, thus came to be required for the establishment of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, did such service also become generally sufficient for this purpose. . . . The common law and common sense jurisdiction of
the forum conveniens yielded to a dogmatic rule of personal service precariously
balanced by a doctrine of forum non conveniens.42
against Neff in Mitchell’s suit, and accordingly awarded the land to Neff. The Supreme
Court affirmed. Id. at 722–33; see also STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 83–84 (summarizing
Pennoyer). Pennoyer took the view that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory, but a state cannot exercise authority
over persons or property outside its boundaries. If a defendant consented to the jurisdiction
of the state courts or was personally served within the state, the state could exercise personal
jurisdiction. Direct assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction exceeded the inherent limits of the
state’s power, making any such resulting judgment unenforceable in other states and not entitled to full faith and credit as well as being void in the rendering state because it had been
obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729–33. This analysis led to the conclusion that Mitchell’s judgment against
Neff could not be validly based on the state’s power over persons within its borders because
Neff had not been personally served in Oregon, nor had he consensually appeared before the
Oregon court. Pennoyer also ruled that the action could not be sustained on the basis of the
state’s power over property within its borders because that property had not been brought
before the court by attachment or any other procedure prior to judgment. Since the judgment
which authorized the sheriff’s sale was therefore invalid, the sale transferred no title, and
Neff regained his land. Id.
42
Ehrenzweig, supra note 40, at 292 (footnotes omitted) (finding that only two of nineteen
cases cited by Restatement support its position). The Restatement to which Ehrenzweig refers is RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), whose primary author was Harvard Law
Professor Joseph Beale. Beale famously championed the formalist approach of lex loci delicti in which the place of injury provided the applicable law of the case regardless of its connection to the parties’ home states and public policy concerns. Because of his unrelenting
legal formalism, Beale became a target of the legal realist movement and this approach to
conflict, although retaining significant support in some quarters, was largely pushed aside by
the “most significant relationship” test of the ALI’s Second Restatement published in 1971.
See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 242–45; see also LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
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But after Pennoyer, it was generally held that service of process upon a defendant in the forum state was enough to confer jurisdiction, even if the defendant was merely passing through and had no non-transient ties to the state.
Although Ehrenzweig’s historical analysis was never refuted, neither did it
prompt courts to back away from the view that tag jurisdiction was constitutionally endorsed by Pennoyer. However, over time, other developments regarding personal jurisdiction would raise questions as to the continued permissibility of tag jurisdiction. As discussed below, the territoriality rationale and
framework of Pennoyer came under increasing criticism. Twenty years after
Ehrenzweig’s article, this criticism would manifest itself in changes to the doctrine of quasi-in-rem personal jurisdiction that had grown up in the wake of
Pennoyer.43 Under this doctrine, if a plaintiff could attach nonresident property
within the forum state, then the state could exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendant but could only enforce a judgment up to the amount of the value
of the attached property.44
Regardless of the correct history of tag jurisdiction via service of process
within the state alone, Pennoyer and its emphasis on state sovereignty within
physical borders established a regime in which service was deemed sufficient

YALE 1927–1960, at 101 (2001) (legal realists on Yale Law faculty directed derision at
Beale, including a mocking poem posted in faculty lounge). In addition to providing a window into academic debate during the twentieth century, the Beale-Ehrenzweig dispute over
the historical roots of tag jurisdiction reflects an ongoing formalism-vs.-functionalism divide
in American law, as well as providing an additional lens for viewing Burnham. As discussed
below, the four-justice Scalia plurality in Burnham is highly formalist: service upon a defendant in the jurisdiction is conclusive of personal jurisdiction regardless of any other factors. Scalia grounds this formalism not only on his preference for this line of analysis (see
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176–77
(1989)), but on purported strength of tag jurisdiction has supposedly ancient roots, a history
that may be in error. This is not to say that formalism is inherently bad. See Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-Enhancing Benefits of Erie Formalism,
44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 970 (2011) (supporting Justice Scalia’s formalist approach to procedure-substance divide presented by Erie questions). However, a narrow formalism that pays
no attention to a doctrine’s consistency with the rest of an area of law or overall considerations of fairness to defendants—the formalism of Burnham’s plurality opinion—has little to
recommend it.
43
See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text, discussing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977).
44
The theory underlying quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is that it provided fairness lacking by
mere publication or other means of notifying nonresident defendants that were not as tangible as personal service. In particular, the doctrine assumed that nonresidents were constructively aware of the status of their property and thus would be sufficiently alerted to an attachment and likely have notice of the action, particularly when attachment was followed by
substituted service such as a mailing indicating the attachment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 6 (1982); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958). Pennoyer also confirmed the constitutionality of in rem jurisdiction, in which a state exercises
judicial control over property physically located in the state and can adjudicate questions of
ownership, use, value, and so on, even if the owner of the property is not subject to personal
jurisdiction. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727–30.
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by most courts, perhaps most infamously in Grace v. MacArthur45 (discussed
below), when service was effected at thirty thousand feet as the defendant flew
over the forum state. In the half-century after Pennoyer, little attention was focused on this area of law but much attention was trained on the problem of establishing jurisdiction over nonresident defendants for injuries arising out of
their activities in the forum state. Courts expanded the reach of the states to
nonresident defendants, who, because of their nonresidence, were difficult to
personally serve within the state unless an enterprising plaintiff was able to
track their movements and effect physical service during the comparatively
brief time the defendant was on state soil (or in its airspace). For example, corporations doing business in the state were deemed to have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction or to be “present” in the state due to their business activities and thus subject to service.46
Expanding automobile travel and its attendant increase in injury and litigation in states where parties were not normally amenable to service created an
additional important tension between the nineteenth-century territoriality rule
of Pennoyer and twentieth-century life. The tension was resolved by adopting
the legal fiction that a driver using the roads of a state had “consented” to suit
in the state (at least for injuries arising out of use of the vehicle), and had constructively appointed the secretary of state or a similar official as agent for service of process.47
By 1945, when the key case of International Shoe v. Washington48 came to
the Court, the deficiencies of post-Pennoyer legal fictions had become sufficiently vexing, particularly regarding the notions of corporate “presence” in a
state. As such, the Court was persuaded to take a significant step away from
Pennoyer’s territoriality—at least with respect to the forum state’s ability to
reach out and exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant that was not physically within the state and subject to service. Famously, International Shoe
concluded, “[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”49
Although the Court’s use of the word “present” raised some issue for debate, the thrust of the opinion made clear that courts should now focus on
45

Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 443 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
See, e.g., Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268 (1917); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 589, 589 (1914). Pennoyer itself also stated that in cases
involving the personal status of the plaintiff, such as divorce actions, the plaintiff’s home
state could issue a judgment on status without personal service upon the absent defendant.
See 95 U.S. at 733–35. Regarding decisions expanding the reach of personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants after Pennoyer, see Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 919–23 (1960).
47
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
48
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
49
Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
46
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whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the state “as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation [or other defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought there.”50
International Shoe’s minimum contacts analysis of course had the practical effect of expanding jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Businesses might
have sufficient tangible presence in a state to be subject to suit there if they
conducted sales activity or intentionally engaged in management activity—at
least for lawsuits arising out of that activity—even if the businesses themselves
were not actually “present” in the jurisdiction.
B. The Intellectual Underpinnings of Tag Jurisdiction Weaken with Modern
Minimum Contacts Jurisprudence
The post-International Shoe world was one of largely expanding personal
jurisdiction, with some later retrenchment, as well as retrenchment regarding
the quasi-in-rem arm of territorially based personal jurisdiction. It also saw the
articulation of two separate lines of personal jurisdictional analysis based on
the degree to which a defendant’s contacts with the forum state were related to
the facts of the lawsuit. Despite these developments, the courts and commentators have continued to treat the far-reaching use of tag jurisdiction as constitutionally permissible rather than as a bygone relic of Pennoyer’s theory of personal jurisdiction based on territoriality and physicality.
1. “Specific” and “General” Personal Jurisdiction
In the “modern” era of personal jurisdiction since the 1945 International
Shoe v. Washington decision,51 courts have (assuming service of process was
proper pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4) focused on whether the
defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state to make the exercise of
jurisdiction there sufficiently fair, thereby satisfying due process. Two categories of personal jurisdiction emerged: “specific” jurisdiction, for cases in which
the defendant’s contacts with the state bore some relation to the substantive
claims of the lawsuit (e.g., shipment of a defective product that injured the
plaintiff user) and “general” jurisdiction that was available where the defendant
had sufficient “continuous and systematic” contacts with the state to make it
fair to sue the defendant in that state even if the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing took place outside the state and had not particular connection to the state.52
50

Id. at 317.
See id.
52
See Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721,
723–27 (1988); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610,
610 (1988) (defining general personal jurisdiction as “dispute-blind, based on affiliations
between the forum and one of the parties without regard to the nature of the dispute” while
“[s]pecific jurisdiction is dispute-specific, based only on affiliations between the forum and
the controversy”).
51
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Over the years, most litigated disputes over personal jurisdiction have involved specific jurisdiction rather than general jurisdiction. For example, in the
seventy years since International Shoe, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided
scores of specific personal jurisdiction cases but only four general jurisdictions
cases.53 In specific jurisdiction cases, jurisdiction expanded significantly after
International Shoe, perhaps reaching an apogee in McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co.,54 which approved exercise of personal jurisdiction by California
courts over a Texas-based insurance company that serviced a single policy in
California (plaintiff’s), but had not otherwise directed any activity toward the
forum state. Beginning in 1979, however, the Court appeared to cut back on the
reach of specific jurisdiction, at least in cases where jurisdiction was founded
upon mobile goods that had come to the forum state in indirect fashion.55
Recent specific personal jurisdiction cases J. McIntyre v. Nicastro56 and
Walden v. Fiore57 have been consistent with this more constrained view of the
reach of minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction but appear not to
have dramatically curtailed the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. For
example, courts since Nicastro have upheld specific personal jurisdiction on the
basis of the defendant injecting its goods into the “stream of commerce” with

53

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 407 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
54
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The policy in question had been sold
by Empire Mutual Ins. Co., an Arizona company, to Californian Lowell Franklin. Plaintiff
McGee was the beneficiary. Defendant International Life acquired Empire Mutual’s book of
business but itself never conducted activity in California or directed toward California, save
for billing and collecting on Franklin’s life insurance policy. The Court concluded that although “there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amendable to suit in California where it had this contract but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process.” See id. at 224. Although the defendant insurer did not have a great quantum of contact
with California, requiring it to defend its refusal to pay a California policyholder in California does not seem particularly unfair. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead—Long
Live Pennoyer: McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. and Jurisdiction Over Individuals,
30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 285 (1958) (supporting decision).
55
See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (deciding Taiwanese tire value manufacturer not subject to personal jurisdiction in California in connection with tire blow-out on motorcycle that injured California plaintiff despite valvemaker’s
shipment of product to motorcycle manufacturer known to sell vehicles in California);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding New York auto
retailer not subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma merely because it was foreseeable
that buyer might use vehicle to travel to Oklahoma were it was involved in collision). But
see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (concluding Michigan-based fastfood franchisee had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to support constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction based on defendant’s volitional activities in contracting with
Florida-based franchisor).
56
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), discussed infra notes 166–70
and accompanying text.
57
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
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clear intent to serve markets in the forum state58 or engaging in conduct that
had distinctly targeted the forum state or had reasonably foreseeable effects in
the forum state.59 Similarly, where a defendant from another jurisdiction had
intentionally hacked into a computer system in the forum state, personal jurisdiction was found for an action arising out of misappropriation of trade secrets
facilitated by the hacking.60
Although the Supreme Court has decided only four general jurisdiction
cases, two (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown61 and Daimler
AG v. Bauman62) were issued after 2010 and appear to have narrowed the situations in which general jurisdiction is available in a more dramatic manner than
Nicastro or Walden v. Fiore has constrained specific personal jurisdiction.63
2. Shaffer v. Heitner and the Partial Death Knell of Purely Territorial
Exercises of Personal Jurisdiction
As the International Shoe regime displaced the Pennoyer paradigm, questions remained not only regarding the limits of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants based on their business activities but also about the continued validity
of quasi-in-rem and transient jurisdiction via service of process. As discussed
below,64 some commentators and courts saw International Shoe as inconsistent
with tag jurisdiction, while most courts continued to view it as viable. Quasi-inrem jurisdiction, however, was not so long lived.

58

See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2013). But see Kason
Indus., Inc. v. Dent Design Hardware, Ltd., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (plaintiffs
failure to aver any patent infringement by defendant in forum state; also no general jurisdiction because plaintiff averred to defendant incorporation, headquarters, or other substantial
presence in forum state; mere sales, even if extensive, insufficient to confer general personal
jurisdiction).
59
See, e.g., Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods, Inc., 704 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2012) (Arkansas corporation could be sued for copyright infringement in Washington, which was the
state copyright holder was located even where defendant had no other contact with Washington because infringement had impact in Washington).
60
See MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2012) (Canadian employee’s use of
Connecticut employer’s computer system, which had server physically located in Connecticut, was sufficient minimum contact to support specific personal jurisdiction). However, a
Canadian broker who was providing services through the conventional means of telephone
and mail and directing shipments of goods that entered the state but were not directly
shipped and who had never visited Missouri was found not to be subject to personal jurisdiction there. See Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. v. Bassett & Walker Int’l, Inc., 702 F.3d 472 (8th
Cir. 2012).
61
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
62
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
63
See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text discussing Nicastro and see supra notes
183–93 and accompanying text discussing Walden v. Fiore, and the contraction of general
personal jurisdiction as contrasted to the expansive reach of general jurisdiction via tag service of process pursuant to Burnham.
64
See supra notes 81–90 and accompanying text.
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Shaffer v. Heitner began as enterprising plaintiff Heitner, pursuing a shareholder’s derivative suit against Greyhound and Greyhound Lines, filed suit in
Delaware, seeking to exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over current or former
officers or directors on the basis of their stock holdings in parent company
Greyhound. These stock holdings were considered to be property situated in
Delaware, the state of the companies’ incorporation, where the shares were registered even if not physically present in the state.65 Subsidiary Greyhound
Lines, Inc. was incorporated in California with a principal place of business in
Arizona. The activities complained of occurred in Oregon.66 Plaintiff Heitner
initially effected jurisdiction through an order of sequestration of the shares
pursuant to a state statute, identifying the property as the common stock owned
by the director and officer defendants.
Pursuant to [the order of sequestration], the sequestrator “seized” approximately
82,000 shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to 19 of the defendants,
and options belonging to another 2 defendants. These seizures were accomplished by placing “stop transfer” orders or their equivalents on the books of the
Greyhound Corp. So far as the record shows, none of the certificates representing the seized property was physically present in Delaware. The stock was considered to be in Delaware, and so subject to seizure, by virtue of Del. Code
Ann., Tit. 8, § 169 (1975), which makes Delaware the situs of ownership of all
stock in Delaware corporations.67

Even under a system strongly supportive of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, this
effort to bring nonresident directors under the authority of Delaware courts
would raise the eyebrows of most observers in view of the nonexistent physical
connection between the tangible property at issue and the forum state. There
was a connection between the defendants and their property rights of stock
ownership, but it was quite attenuated. Although a shareholder’s derivative action often examines corporate conduct (and Delaware was the state in which the
corporation in question was domiciled), it is not a corporate governance action
per se that would make a strong case for forcing nonresident director and officer defendants to face litigation in Delaware absent other contacts with the
state.68
65

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189–90 (1977) (“In essence, Heitner alleged that the
individual defendants had violated their duties to Greyhound by causing it and its subsidiary
to engage in actions that resulted in the corporations being held liable for substantial damages in a private antitrust suit and a large fine in a criminal contempt action.” (footnote omitted)).
66
Id. at 190 nn.2–3 (A judgment of more than $13 million was entered against Greyhound
in Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977); Greyhound and
Greyhound Lines were fined $100,000 and $500,00 respectively in United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974)).
67
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 191–92 (footnotes omitted).
68
In the wake of Shaffer’s invalidation of the stock sequestration mode of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, the Delaware legislature amended the statute to provide that anyone agreeing to be
a director or officer of a Delaware-charted corporation consents to personal jurisdiction in
Delaware courts. Thus, although the instant defendants won an important battle in Shaffer v.
Heitner, they arguably lost the larger war of trying to avoid personal jurisdiction in a compa-
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Thus, the stage was set for re-examination of the quasi-in-rem concept and
perhaps an attempt to harmonize this method of obtaining personal jurisdiction
with the post-International Shoe world of minimum contacts jurisdiction. The
Court seized the opportunity and not only struck down the use of legally fictitious stock sequestration but also declared quasi-in-rem jurisdiction—and all
forms of obtaining personal jurisdiction—subject to the minimum contacts
analysis set forth in International Shoe. In barring the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents on the basis of the attached shares of stock alone,
the Court made statements that, even if read narrowly, would seem to command
that a fairness or reasonableness inquiry accompany any exercise of personal
jurisdiction by any means if the exercise is to comport with due process.
The Delaware courts rejected appellants’ jurisdictional challenge by noting
that this suit was brought as a quasi in rem proceeding. Since quasi in rem jurisdiction is traditionally based on attachment or seizure of property present in the
jurisdiction, not on contacts between the defendant and the State, the courts considered appellants’ claimed lack of contacts with Delaware to be unimportant.
This categorical analysis assumes the continued soundness of the conceptual
structure founded on the century-old case of Pennoyer v. Neff.69
* * *
The Pennoyer rules [that the state was all-powerful over persons or property within its borders but had no power outside those borders] generally favored
nonresident defendants by making them harder to sue. This advantage was reduced, however, by the ability of a resident plaintiff to satisfy a claim against a
nonresident defendant by bringing into court any property of the defendant located in the plaintiff’s State.70
* * *
[In International Shoe,] the Court began its analysis of [the jurisdictional] question by noting that the historical basis of in personam jurisdiction was a court’s
power over the defendant’s person. That power, however, was no longer the central concern:
“But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mininy’s state of incorporation. This result, although based on arguably coercive consent obtained as a condition of being a director or officer, squares well with the Court’s more recent
general jurisdiction decisions in Goodyear and Daimler, discussed infra notes 158–65 &
171–82, which focused on a company’s state of incorporation and state of principal place of
business as logically fair locations for litigation against a company. Notwithstanding some
arguable elements of coercion, it also meets a standard of fairness and reasonableness. Directors and officers are ordinarily well compensated for their service, are usually already persons of wealth and means, and can easily refuse to accept any managerial post or directorship if they dislike being subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of the corporation with
which they are affiliated. Of course, this same reasonableness makes the exercise of quasiin-rem jurisdiction invalidated in Shaffer v. Heitner far fairer and more reasonable than many
instances of tag jurisdiction by service of process.
69
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 196.
70
Id. at 200.

1220

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1203

mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”
Thus, the inquiry into the State’s jurisdiction over a foreign corporation appropriately focused not on whether the corporation was “present” but on whether
there have been “such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.”71
Mechanical or quantitative evaluations of the defendant’s activities in the
forum could not resolve the question of reasonableness:
“Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause
to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”72

As the Shaffer Court observed, the “immediate effect of” International
Shoe’s “departure from Pennoyer’s conceptual apparatus was to increase the
ability of the state courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants” but “[n]o equally dramatic change has occurred in the law governing
jurisdiction in rem. There have, however, been intimations that the collapse of
the in personam wing of Pennoyer has not left that decision unweakened as a
foundation for in rem jurisdiction.”
The Court noted, “Well-reasoned lower court opinions have questioned the
proposition that the presence of property in a State gives that State jurisdiction
to adjudicate rights to the property regardless of the relationship of the underlying dispute and the property owner to the forum.”73 The Court further observed,
“The overwhelming majority of commentators have also rejected Pennoyer’s
premise that a proceeding ‘against’ property is not a proceeding against the
owners of that property. Accordingly, they urge” that International Shoe’s fairness and reasonableness criteria “also govern [state] power to adjudicate personal rights to property located in the State.”74
71

Id. at 203 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Id. at 203–04 (citations omitted) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945)). The Shaffer Court also observed that “[a]s the language quoted indicates, the
International Shoe Court believed that the standard it was setting forth governed actions
against natural persons as well as corporations, and we see no reason to disagree” although
“[t]he differences between individuals and corporations may, of course, lead to the conclusion that a given set of circumstances establishes state jurisdiction over one type of defendant but not over the other.” Id. at 204 n.19.
73
Id. at 205 (citing cases).
74
Id. at 205 (citing (in this order) Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Roger Traynor, Is
This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657 (1959); Ehrenzweig, supra note 40;
Developments in the Law, supra note 46; and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241 (1965)). This aspect of the Shaffer Court’s
opinion is something more than a court string-citing favorable authority aligning with a conclusion the court has already reached. The articles cited are by frequency of citation and stat72
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Having so set the stage, the Shaffer Court made clear that it was, depending
on one’s view, either changing the law of in rem and quasi-in-rem personal jurisdiction or (perhaps belatedly) expressly recognizing that it had been implicitly changed by International Shoe.75 The Court explained that jurisdiction over
property is in effect jurisdiction over the property’s owner as well and that
“[t]his recognition leads to the conclusion” that exercises of in rem jurisdiction
must still satisfy “the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International
Shoe.”76
Applying the minimum contacts test and its necessary inquiry into the fairness and reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident, nondomiciliary defendant, the Court struck down the Delaware courts’ exercise of
jurisdiction over the Greyhound officers and directors with no ties to the state
other than their intangibly sequestered company stock.77 Although predicting
that its decision would not affect most litigation because of the variety of ties
defendants have to a forum state, the Court made clear that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was no longer permissible solely because of its historically accepted
status.78
Concluding with a bit of a flourish after an extensive refutation of arguments supporting jurisdiction in the case, the Shaffer Court provided a rather
clear declaration in support of applying the minimum contacts fairness/reasonableness template to not only quasi-in-rem jurisdiction but to tag
transient jurisdiction as well.
ure among the most important personal jurisdiction articles of the 1950s and 1960s and were
largely written by the leading legal scholars in the area, including one (former Cal-Berkeley
law professor and California Chief Justice Roger Traynor) who was widely regarded as the
finest state court judge of the era.
75
Id. at 206 (“It is clear, therefore, that the law of state-court jurisdiction no longer stands
securely on the foundation established in Pennoyer. We think that the time is ripe to consider
whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice set forth in International Shoe should
be held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam.” (footnote omitted)) (citing to, inter
alia, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 68, cmt. c (noting that the exercise of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) “might be thought inconsistent with the basic principle of reasonableness”)).
76
Id. at 207.
77
Id. at 208–09, 216–17.
78
See id. at 208–09.
It appears, therefore, that jurisdiction over many types of actions which now are or might
be brought in rem would not be affected by a holding that any assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the International Shoe standard. For the type of quasi in rem action typified by
Harris v. Balk and the present case, however, accepting the proposed analysis would result in
significant change. These are cases where the property which now serves as the basis for statecourt jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Thus, although the
presence of the defendant’s property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among
the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support
the State’s jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the State is now
thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in that forum.

Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 209–16 (considering and rejecting prudential, public
policy, or practicality arguments in favor of retaining traditional approach to quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction).

1222

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1203

The Due Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment . . . against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”
Delaware’s assertion of jurisdiction over appellants in this case is inconsistent with that constitutional limitation on state power. The judgment of the
Delaware Supreme Court must, therefore, be reversed.79

Earlier in the opinion, the Shaffer Court had summarized its assessment in
the now oft-quoted passage stating that the Court concluded, “[A]ll assertions
of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth
in International Shoe and its progeny.”80 Regarding quasi-in-rem jurisdiction,
the Court emphasized, “The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property
supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued
acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.”81
Although Shaffer v. Heitner does not expressly require that tag jurisdiction
be eliminated or measured according to a minimum contacts yardstick, this is
the most reasonable reading of Shaffer.82 If a state cannot exert jurisdiction by
taking control over property within the state, how logically can it acquire personal jurisdiction (and general personal jurisdiction at that) over a nonresident
defendant—over any claim at all against the defendant—merely because the
defendant was served with process while passing through the state, however
briefly or trivially?
To ask the question (albeit a rhetorical one) is to answer it. Logically, to be
consistent with International Shoe and Shaffer, transient jurisdiction must involve service on a defendant that has sufficient minimum contacts with the fo79

Id. at 216–17 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
Id. at 212.
81
Id.
82
See David H. Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction—A Speculation
on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 273, 303 (1978) (arguing that tag
jurisdiction could not satisfy due process under analysis used by the Court in Shaffer v. Heitner); see also Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of An Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV.
33 (1978) (same). Accord Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on
State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77 (1980) (sovereignty rationale of personal
jurisdiction inconsistent with due process analysis focused on fairness to defendant); Martin
H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation,
75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981) (same); Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 842–44 (1995) (reading Shaffer as undermining
any assertion of jurisdiction premised solely on state power and suggesting that exercise of
“status” or in rem-like jurisdiction over divorce is unconstitutional if defendant lacks sufficient minimum contacts with forum state); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 52, at 748,
752–55 (due process implications of tag jurisdiction are “an unresolved question” and application of Shaffer is “not at all clear”). Nearly twenty years prior to Shaffer, the Harvard Law
Review staff working on a Developments in the Law project concluded that tag jurisdiction
was inconsistent with International Shoe and likely violated due process. See Developments
in the Law, supra note 46, at 937–40; see also supra note 73, cited in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
205.
80
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rum. Perhaps that contact need not be as weighty, sustained, or volitional as the
contacts used to support long-arm jurisdiction. Perhaps service alone is a reasonably significant contact. But after International Shoe and Shaffer, service
alone would seem by itself not to be conclusive of the existence of personal jurisdiction if the jurisdictional rules are to be consistent.
Further, Shaffer’s expression of this sentiment was nearly unanimous. No
Justices dissented from the result (Justice Rehnquist did not participate) and
although Justices Powell and Stevens concurred, their opinions were not inconsistent with a view that tag jurisdiction is subject to the fairness/reasonableness
inquiry of International Shoe. Neither was Justice Brennan’s partial dissent regarding some of the majority’s reasoning nonetheless “fully agree[d] that the
minimum-contacts analysis developed in [International Shoe] represents a far
more sensible construct for the exercise of state-court jurisdiction than the
patchwork of legal and factual fictions that has been generated from [Pennoyer].”83
Justice Powell in fact agreed with the extension of “the principles of International Shoe Co. v. Washington” to assertions of in rem jurisdiction, as well as
to the Shaffer result. He wrote to “explicitly reserve judgment, however, on
whether the ownership of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably
and permanently located within a State may, without more, provide the contacts
necessary” to support exercise over personal jurisdiction and enforcement of
any resulting judgment “to the extent of the value of the property.”84 He observed that with real property in particular, there were almost inherently sufficient contacts with the forum to make exercise of personal jurisdiction fair so
long as the defendant’s liability did not exceed the value of the attached real
property in the forum state.85
Justice Stevens concurred, focusing on issues of notice and the degree to
which a defendant’s contacts with the forum state might be said to give rise to
83

Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Perhaps presaging his concurrence in
Burnham, Justice Brennan expressed a very broad view of what constituted sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to satisfy the fairness/reasonableness test of International
Shoe. In his view, purchase of stock in a Delaware-chartered company was a sufficient contact with the forum state in view of the benefits derived from such ownership such as investment income and application of forum law to corporate governance disputes, often enforced by forum state courts. See id. at 222–28. In light of the attractiveness of Delaware as a
situs for incorporation, his position is defensible, albeit beyond most understandings of sufficient contact with a forum state. Justice Brennan also objected to the majority opinion as deciding more than was necessary to resolve the case and hence constituting an impermissible
advisory opinion. See id. at 220–21. Importantly, however, Justice Brennan was completely
in accord with the view that tag transient jurisdiction must be assessed according to a minimum contacts standard. Although Justice Brennan frequently took a charitable view of what
constituted sufficient minimum contacts, one can also reasonably posit that even these broad
notions of sufficient fairness and reasonableness would not support effective tag jurisdiction
over persons stopping for gas, changing planes or trains, or flying over a state, although his
Burnham opinion can be read in that manner.
84
Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
85
Id. at 219.
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“predictable risks” of being sued in the state. He found that the purchase of
stock did not adequately apprise a purchaser of such risks.86 In an important
passage that is sometimes misread as suggesting a continued allegiance to tag
jurisdiction, he wrote, “I would also not read [the Court’s decision] as invalidating other long-accepted methods of acquiring jurisdiction over persons with
adequate notice of both the particular controversy and the fact that their local
activities might subject them to suit.”87
This passage can be hurriedly read as a view that because Shaffer involved
only quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, Shaffer did not also invalidate in personem jurisdiction by service alone. But it is important to note that in this passage, Justice Stevens was emphasizing his view that for other traditional methods of acquiring jurisdiction to be valid, they must both provide adequate notice and
involve defendants who could fairly and reasonably believe that they had engaged in sufficient forum state activity to be subject to suit in the forum state.
Although this passage may indicate that Justice Stevens was amenable to tag
jurisdiction in cases where there was also sufficient defendant contact with the
forum, the passage also clearly suggests that he would have opposed the exercise of tag jurisdiction upon defendants driving briefly on state roads, stopping
for gas, changing planes at an airport, or flying over the state.
C. Up in the Air: Testing the Limits of Tag Jurisdiction in the PostInternational Shoe and Post-Shaffer Era
1. Service on the Move
International Shoe did not address service of process and its relationship to
what came to be known as specific personal jurisdiction. Neither did Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining,88 the Court’s leading (indeed, then the only) general
personal jurisdiction case of the time. Judicial concern with service of process
focused primarily upon whether the defendant was provided with adequate notice of the action rather than whether service within state territory was a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Even though International
Shoe conceptualized the due process inquiry as one focusing on the relationship
between forum contact and fairness, there appears to have been no significant
86

Id. at 217–19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
One who purchases shares of stock on the open market can hardly be expected to know
that he has thereby become subject to suit in a forum remote from his residence and unrelated to
the transaction. . . . For unless the purchaser ascertains both the State of incorporation of the
company whose shares he is buying, and also the idiosyncrasies of its law, he may be assuming
an unknown risk of litigation. I therefore agree with the Court that on the record before us no adequate basis for jurisdiction exists and that the Delaware statute is unconstitutional on its face.

Id. (emphasis added). But in making this observation, Justice Stevens perhaps unduly glosses
over the degree to which the defendants were not run-of-the-mill stock buyers but were officers and directors of the company.
87
Id. at 219.
88
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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questioning of the continuing vitality of tag jurisdiction (or quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, which was subsequently curtailed in Shaffer v. Heitner).
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,89 the Court’s most extensive discussion of the due process concerns surrounding service and notice,
the Court did little to shed light on whether the International Shoe approach,
which had obviously displaced Pennoyer regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction,
had also displaced other portions of the Pennoyer paradigm.
In the wake of International Shoe, the legal profession focused on the aspects of Pennoyer that expanded jurisdiction beyond the physical boundaries of
the forum state; however, everyone appeared to have paid relatively little attention to the aspects of International Shoe that logically called into question traditional state exercises of personal jurisdiction based on physical power that
might not be consistent with International Shoe’s concern over fairness and
reasonable expectation of being subject to suit in the forum state. As a result, it
appears that lawyers continued to consider tag jurisdiction and (until Shaffer v.
Heitner) quasi-in-rem jurisdiction as legitimate and courts did not block such
moves. These methods for obtaining personal jurisdiction probably have been
used much less now that International Shoe and state long-arm statutes permitted rather expansive assertions of personal jurisdiction where a defendant was
regularly conducting activity in the forum state that reasonably related to a particular lawsuit or the subject matter of the lawsuit.
2. Grace v. MacArthur: The Trial Court Case as an Illustrative and
Misleading Icon That Presages the Burnham Plurality Opinion
Grace v. MacArthur is probably the most outlandish example of the exercise of tag service being used to establish personal jurisdiction notwithstanding
the new jurisdictional paradigm of fairness and reasonable expectation.90 The
case involved a business dispute, with the plaintiff seeking specific performance of a purported sales contract with Bankers Life and Casualty and its
prominent head, insurance tycoon and posthumous philanthropist John D.
MacArthur.91 As one might expect, in the post-International Shoe world, ob89

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Less outlandish examples such as that of Whitney v. Madden, 79 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. 1948)
were probably common even if not frequently resulting in reported opinions. In Whitney, an
Ohio resident was served on behalf of a Minnesota plaintiff asserting a defamation claim
while the defendant was “spending the night as a guest in a Chicago hotel and while in transit from one part of the United States to another.” 79 N.E.2d at 594. All judges hearing the
case appear to have regarded the service-while-traveling as effective to establish personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in Illinois, but these same judges also readily agreed that the
case should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.
91
John D. MacArthur owned, controlled, and operated not only Bankers Life but a number
of insurers and had something of a robber baron’s reputation in that during his time at the
helm his companies were known as being a difficult employer who established a corporate
culture of undue resistance to or slow payment of policyholder claims. See generally NANCY
KRIPLEN, THE ECCENTRIC BILLIONAIRE: JOHN D. MACARTHUR—EMPIRE BUILDER,
90
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taining long-arm jurisdiction over a large insurance company, even in relatively
small, agrarian Arkansas, was not difficult under a theory of “doing business”
jurisdiction92 that may no longer be viable in the wake of Goodyear and Daimler, discussed below.93 Plaintiff set forth allegations of business contact between MacArthur and the forum state that were not resolved in the opinion but
were arguably sufficient to satisfy the state long-arm statute and due process.
But suing MacArthur’s co-defendant Ronnie Smith in Arkansas proved more of
a challenge in that Smith apparently had no physical connection to the state and
no financial or real estate holdings tied to the state.
Undeterred, plaintiff Grace arranged to have defendant Smith served while
his non-stop flight on Braniff Airlines Flight 337 from Memphis to Dallas was
over Pine Bluff, Arkansas, in the Eastern District of Arkansas. Smith challenged the service and the court’s jurisdiction over him. The trial court (and apparently counsel) appear to have explicitly accepted that transient jurisdiction
satisfied due process. The harder question for the court was whether service on
an airplane at twenty thousand feet was sufficiently inside Arkansas to qualify
for tag jurisdiction.94
In their briefs in connection with Smith’s motion[,] counsel on both sides
state that they have been unable to find any case dealing with the specific problem in hand. The Court likewise has been unable to find such a case. Nonetheless, the Court is persuaded that a person moving in interstate commerce across
the State of Arkansas in a regular commercial aircraft, flying in the regular navigable airspace above the State, is within the “territorial limits” of the State and is
amenable to service . . . .95

RELUCTANT PHILANTHROPIST, RELENTLESS ADVERSARY (2008). After his death, MacArthur’s
name became more prominently associated with philanthropy, particularly the “genius”
awards distributed by the John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, a regular sponsor
of public television programs. The awards are famous because of their size (a quarter-million
dollars or more) and the Foundation’s secretive selection method. One cannot apply for the
award; it just comes to those who emerge from the secretive selective process (former
UNLV Professor David Hickey is a recipient). The recipients can use the funds for anything
they wish and the criteria, such as it is known, is simply that the recipient have demonstrated
great talent, hence the “genius” award name. See id.
92
See Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction,
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (2001); Twitchell, supra note 52, at 635 (viewing exercises of
jurisdiction based on defendant business activity in state a form of general jurisdiction but
finding that many such cases also involve connection between the forum and the subject
matter or other parties of the dispute).
93
See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 171–82 and accompanying text.
94
See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (“The narrow question
for us to decide is whether for service purposes, the passengers on a commercial aircraft are
within the territorial limits of the State over which the plane happens to be flying at a particular time.”).
95
Id.

Summer 2015]

THE IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH

1227

The MacArthur court based its ruling on federal aviation statutes governing
airspace.96 Citing regulatory precedent, the trial court noted that “[t]he sovereign power and jurisdiction of a state is not limited to the ground”97 and “assertions of [state regulatory] jurisdiction are valid where they do not conflict with
controlling federal legislation.”98 Judge Jesse Smith Henley, the trial judge in
MacArthur,99 focused on issues of state sovereignty and drew heavily on statefederal division of regulatory authority and state policy power authority,100 rather than examining whether the exercise of jurisdiction based on slap service
at twenty thousand feet comported sufficiently with standards of fair play and
substantive justice.
One reads MacArthur and begins to wonder whether the opinion might
even have predated International Shoe because of the former’s relentless but
unreflective view that in-state service alone justifies the exercise of personal
jurisdiction in the forum state.101 The opinion, issued eighty-five years after
96

See id. (“[I]t is clear that an aircraft flying over a State is within that State and is subject
to its jurisdiction” for purposes of regulating air travel.).
97
Id. (quoting State v. Nw. Airlines, 7 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. 1942) and citing other cases, relying particularly on Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385 (Mass. 1930), a
leading case of the time regarding state-federal boundaries in air traffic regulation).
98
Id. at 445 (citing Braniff Airlines v. Neb. Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S.
590 (1954), which involved the scope of taxing authority among the various states where
commerce took place).
99
As is apparent to the reader, I am highly critical of Grace v. MacArthur and its reasoning.
My initial trial hypothesis was that the district judge rendering the decision might simply
have not been very good. Much to my surprise, Judge Henley (1917–1997), had a most impressive resume and list of accomplishments. See Morris S. Arnold, A Tribute to Judge J.
Smith Henley, 52 ARK. L. REV. 297 (1999). An Eisenhower appointee at a time when the
Administration was looking for judges sufficiently independent and courageous to enforce
Brown v. Board and Justice Department desegregation orders, Judge Henley served for more
than fifteen years as a district judge and another seven as an Eighth Circuit judge. The federal building and courthouse in Fort Smith is named after him. His strong reputation prompts
greater mystery. How could a good judge have written such a bad opinion? Grace v. McArthur was one of Judge Henley’s very first opinions, issued while he was an interim appointee
to the Eastern District of Arkansas during several months in 1959. The Senate did not approve his nomination, which was resubmitted by the White House but for a vacancy in the
Western District of Arkansas, where he then sat for fifteen years. It may not be all that speculative to think that a more experienced Judge Henley (and certainly one writing after Shaffer v. Heitner) would not so slavishly applied tag transient jurisdiction.
100
See MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. at 445–46. For example, the MacArthur court relied on one
case involving seizure of contraband liquor on a flight from Canada by state authorities
(United States v. One Pitcairn Bi-plane, 11 F. Supp. 24, 25 (W.D.N.Y. 1935)) and upon
Commerce Clause and state riparian rights precedents. See id.
101
The MacArthur court’s only concern seems to involve the distance of defendant’s travel
from the ground. See id. at 447 (“It may be conceded, perhaps, that a time may come, and
may not be far distant, when commercial aircraft will fly at altitudes so high that it would be
unrealistic to consider them as being within the territorial limits of the United States or of
any particular State while fling at such altitudes. But no such situation is here presented. We
have an ordinary commercial aircraft, flying on an ordinary commercial flight in the ordinary
navigable and navigated airspace of 1958.”). Presumably, then, the MacArthur court would
have found service sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in any state along the route of an
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Pennoyer, reads as though the jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction had remained static during all that time. “[A]t the time the Marshal served the summons on the defendant, Smith, the plane and its passengers were within the
‘territorial limits’ of the State of Arkansas, as that term is used in [Rule 4].
Hence, Smith’s motion to quash will be denied.”102
The court gives a nod to fairness concerns, but only after framing the issue
in a most bizarre way. In what, to me, is an amazing part of the opinion, the
court states:
The result here reached seems to be just, equitable and practical. It cannot seriously be contended that a person moving in interstate commerce is on that account exempt from service of process while in transit, and we [the royal “we” in
that this was a single judge district court decision] think it makes no practical
difference whether he is traveling at the time on a plane, or on a bus or train, or
in his own car. True, if he is going by plane the duration of his presence in the
State will probably be much shorter than if he were availing himself of some
other means of transportation, but that is a difference of degree only, not of principle.103

Apart from the service-in-flight problem, the MacArthur court arguably
erred in that the court takes as a given that service of process on state soil gives
the state in personam jurisdiction over the defendant (over any matter, not just
those related to defendant contacts with the forum state), even in situations
such as the defendant briefly stepping over a state line once in his life to purchase an ice cream cone. So long as the brief sojourn for ice cream was voluntary and not procured by fraud, a state in which the defendant has spent perhaps
ninety seconds can be sued over disputes relating not only to the ice cream cone
but to disputes that any prospective plaintiff may have with the defendant (provided that the plaintiff has a process server on hand when the ice cream “trip”
takes place).
Once MacArthur accepts this assumption, it is then no more unfair to serve
the defendant while in an airplane rather than when making an isolated purchase, even though both involve only unique or episodic as well as trivial contact unrelated to the underlying dispute, any injury inflicted in the state, and
any real state interest in the matter or the parties. Although this may technically
satisfy some strained strand of formal logic, it seems inherently nonsensical and
unfair.104
airline flight. Thus, on a typical Boston to Los Angeles flight, a defendant who was only on
Massachusetts or California soil could, depending on the flight path of the airplane, be
sued—over anything—in as many as a dozen states (New Hampshire, Vermont, New York,
Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Nevada) that are in the potential flight path even though the defendant had never had any contact with any of these
states.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
See Brilmayer et al., supra note 52, at 753–54 (“Suppose, for example, a state adopts a
long-arm statute predicating jurisdiction upon the defendant’s prior presence in the state at
any time and directing notice by registered mail. This statute probably would violate due
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To be sure, the most absurd aspects of such situations can be mitigated by
motions to dismiss due to improper venue,105 to transfer to a more convenient
venue (where the transferee court is within the federal system),106 or by a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds (where a possible alternative
court with proper venue or better venue lies within another judicial system).107
But even if instances of truly absurd unfairness can be avoided through use of
these other doctrines, the defendant trapped by tag service is, unless permitted
to argue International Shoe fairness as a basis for Rule 12(b)(2) dismissal, subjected to the risk of deprivation of property by a forum with essentially no connection to the defendant. At a minimum, the defendant is burdened by the significant imposition of being forced to fight this subjugation on venue grounds,
an area where courts have wider discretion than in matters of personal jurisdiction.108 Further, if such a case miraculously stays in the forum state of tag jurisdiction, the presiding court will have vast discretion regarding choice of applicable law.109
In short, Grace v. MacArthur seems like a bizarre hypothetical dreamed up
by a faculty member to torment first-year students; nevertheless, it actually held
that merely getting on a plane in Memphis (with a process server lurking on the
flight) could subject a defendant to suit in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. With this conclusion, the court used reasoning that would support the exercise of general
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Alaska, Hawaii, or anywhere in the
United States, had the flight been sufficiently long. In reaching this astonishing
result, the district court applied only the mechanical, territorial thinking of
Pennoyer and essentially ignored the fairness and reasonableness due process
analysis of International Shoe.

process, but its underlying notice rationale differs little from that for transient jurisdiction.”);
Developments in the Law, supra note 46, at 939 (“To assert jurisdiction on the basis of a
brief physical appearance within a state, however,—perhaps during an airplane flight across
its territory—seems totally inconsistent with an analysis of the relevant interests and appears
to impose unjustifiable hardship on the defendant.”).
105
See 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012).
106
See id. § 1404.
107
Forum non conveniens dismissal is well established in the federal system. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). It is
also available in most states. See, e.g., Whitney v. Madden, 79 N.E.2d 593, 595–96 (Ill.
1948) (tag service conferred personal jurisdiction but case dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds).
108
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (even where venue is proper, court may transfer action to another
court where venue is more convenient); HAZARD ET AL., supra note 30, §§ 3.13–3.16.
109
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981); see also Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328–29 (1979) (striking down state’s attempt to assert in rem jurisdiction over insurance policy) (another case suggesting due process limits on personal jurisdiction that is in tension with MacArthur and the Scalia opinion in Burnham). Regarding the
malleability of choice of law analysis and the Supreme Court’s reluctance to police lower
court exercises of discretion, see Thomas O. Main, On Teaching Conflicts and Why I Dislike
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 12 NEV. L.J. 600 (2012).

1230

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1203

Although exerting authority over defendant Smith, the trial court reserved
decision on defendant MacArthur’s motion to quash (which was apparently
made without an alternative motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).
The ground was that a separate examination of the Arkansas long-arm statute
and MacArthur’s contacts with the jurisdiction were in order and that further
abstention might be required until the issue of Smith’s status as a purported
agent of MacArthur was resolved.110 There are no further reported decisions in
the case, which presumably settled, so there is no record of any resolution of
the personal jurisdiction question surrounding defendant MacArthur.
3. The Odd Treatment of Grace v. MacArthur as Authoritative
In light of its problematic holding and reasoning, one might have expected
Grace v. McArthur to have faded into relative obscurity. Instead, it escaped that
fate and became something of a poster child of resistance to the logical consequences of the new fairness/reasonableness approach of International Shoe. In
fact, as discussed below, it provided support for Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Burnham, even if MacArthur was not cited. MacArthur also subsequently provided support for the mythology of Burnham (that the Scalia opinion represents
the definitive “law” regarding transient jurisdiction).
Grace v. MacArthur was not only memorable on its facts, but also became
enshrined as an illustration of the continued availability of tag jurisdiction. Although only cited in ten subsequent judicial decisions during the ensuing sixtyfive years, the subsequent cases all largely embraced the reasoning of the decision.111 For example, in Moore v. Lindsay, a trial court (writing only a year before Burnham) denied a Rule 12(b)(2) motion by a defendant “personally
served with the summons in this case when she was visiting friends or relatives
in Danville, Virginia.”112 The claim was based on the defendant having furnished an allegedly defective ladder to a workman performing repairs at defendant’s Oregon home.113 Defendant Bonnie Lindsey, who had been served
while on the Virginia trip (her husband had not been served and his motion to
dismiss was consequently granted by the trial court),114 argued that being sued
in Virginia, a state in which she did no business and owned no property, violat110

See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447–48 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
See, e.g., Leab v. Streit, 584 F. Supp. 748, 755–56 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (although law of personal jurisdiction has changed since Pennoyer, “[p]resence within a state, even temporary or
transitory presence, is still a common law basis instilling competence in the courts of that
state to adjudicate claims against a person”) (citing MacArthur and Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); see also id. at 756 (citing Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) for the proposition that domicile is sufficient for assertion of
personal jurisdiction even if domiciliary not in forum state at time of lawsuit or activity giving rise to lawsuit).
112
Moore v. Lindsay, No. 89-0008-D, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18042, at *1 (W.D. Va. July
7, 1989).
113
Id. at *1.
114
Id. at *6–7.
111
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ed her due process rights when the lawsuit had no connection to her visit to
Virginia.115
The Moore v. Lindsay trial court, although appreciating defendant’s argument based on International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner, was unsympathetic
but addressed the issue at length in an arguably deeper and more nuanced manner than would the Burnham Court a year later.
The apparently sweeping language of Shaffer has caused several commentators to speculate that the Supreme Court had brushed aside the old cases such
as [Pennoyer], that had approved jurisdiction based simply on the defendant’s
“presence” in the forum, no matter how brief. Some courts in the past had carried the notion of presence quite far, to the extent of approving personal service
of the defendant on an airplane flying over the forum state. Since Shaffer, a few
courts have decided that personal service on a defendant who is only a transient
in the forum state may not be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Several other courts have held, however, that a defendant’s transient presence in the
forum state is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction.
In light of the general modern trend to expand the possible bases of courts’
jurisdiction, I believe the better-reasoned decisions are those upholding transient
presence as a basis for jurisdiction. . . .
I do not believe that the Supreme Court intended in Shaffer v. Heitner to
sweep away the most traditional basis for a court’s exercise of jurisdiction: the
defendant’s presence in the forum state. . . .
....
In the case before me, the defendant Bonnie Lindsay voluntarily came into
the forum state, Virginia. Since a previous action against her had been dismissed
because the plaintiff had not properly served the defendants, Lindsay was probably aware that she was in danger of being served with process. Once Lindsay
physically entered Virginia, she took the risk that the state would exercise its
power over her person or her property. [Therefore,] personal service on Bonnie
Lindsay while she was in Virginia is a sufficient basis for this Court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over her.116
115

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *3–6 (citations omitted). Compare Nehemiah v. Athletics Cong. of U.S.A., 765
F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985) (service on transient defendant alone not enough to establish personal
jurisdiction); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (same) with Aluminal Indus., Inc. v. Newtown Commercial Assocs., 89 F.R.D. 326,
328–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (service within forum confers personal jurisdiction over served defendant for all matters); Lockert v. Breedlove, 361 S.E.2d 581, 585 (N.C. 1987) (same);
Cariaga v. Dist. Court, 762 P.2d 886, 887 (Nev. 1988) (same); Nutri-W. v. Gibson, 764 P.2d
693, 695–96 (Wyo. 1988) (same). Moore v. Lindsay also approvingly quoted Amusement
Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1985) for the view that “[i]f there is anything that characterizes sovereignty, it is the state’s dominion over its territory and those
within it.” 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18042, at *5–6. As the Lindsay court also noted, Mordelt
found that “there was a sufficient basis for a Louisiana court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a
West German company when the company’s general manager was personally served while
attending a New Orleans trade show.” Id. at *5. What the Lindsay court appeared not to appreciate was that service on a mere agent of a corporation is generally not enough, standing
alone, to subject the corporate entity to personal jurisdiction in the forum state but that the
agent’s attendance at the trade show may have been (at the time the Mordelt Court rendered
116
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In addition to service of process as an anti-tourism argument for Virginia
(and every other state in the Union), Moore v. Lindsay engages in selective
reading of both International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner. The Lindsay Court
cleaved to the portion of International Shoe that supported extensive extraterritorial jurisdiction based on a nonresident defendant’s volitional contacts
with the state related to the dispute; however, it essentially shrugged off the
equally or more important portion of International Shoe that emphasized fairness and reasonableness rather than territoriality and physical power alone.
Similarly, the Lindsay Court’s reading of Shaffer v. Heitner focused not on
Justice Marshall’s majority opinion, but rather the concurrence of Justice Stevens, which cautioned that Shaffer should not be construed “as invalidating
other long-accepted methods of acquiring jurisdiction over persons with adequate notice of both the particular controversy and the fact that their local activities might subject them to suit.”117 Despite agreeing with the majority that
Delaware’s assertion of quasi-in-rem personal jurisdiction based upon a nonresident’s ownership of stock in a Delaware-chartered corporation violated due
process, Justice Stevens added:
The requirement of fair notice also, I believe, includes fair warning that a
particular activity may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.
If I visit another State, or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I
knowingly assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over my property or my person while there. My contact with the State, though minimal, gives
rise to predictable risks.118

The Stevens concurrence is hardly an endorsement of broad tag jurisdiction. Most obviously, Justice Stevens is writing for himself and was not a vote
necessary to the majority holding. Like Justice Powell, who also wrote a solo
concurrence, Justice Stevens expresses an important view that bespeaks some
caution before rejecting tag jurisdiction; however, this is a far cry from the
Shaffer Court as a whole reaffirming tag jurisdiction when it has become so inconsistent with the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence as a whole. A
more reasonable reading of the Stevens concurrence is that even a brief visitor
may be stopped by police or required to pay tolls, but it hardly follows that the
state one is temporarily visiting can “exercise its power” over the visitor to adjudicate claims against the visitor that have nothing to do with the state.
Perhaps most disturbing about Moore v. Lindsay and other modern cases
supporting tag jurisdiction (including the various opinions in Burnham disits decision) sufficient business in the forum state or may have been sufficiently related to
the underlying law suit to satisfy the minimum contacts test. Cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (holding in 5–4 decision that English manufacturer had insufficient contact with New Jersey to satisfy due process despite defendant’s attendance at
trade show in Las Vegas and contact with other U.S. States).
117
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219 (Stevens, J., concurring), quoted in Lindsay, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18042, at *6.
118
Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring), quoted in Lindsay, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18042, at
*5.
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cussed below) is that there is no serious effort to compare the functional differences between tag jurisdiction and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Such a comparison, if done fairly and logically, leads inexorably to the conclusion that if quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is only valid upon passing a minimum contacts fairfairness/reasonableness analysis, the same must be true of tag jurisdiction.
Under a regime of tag jurisdiction, a once-in-a-lifetime, two-second step
over a state border can (if a process server is hovering about) subject the defendant to general personal jurisdiction far beyond anything imposed on even
the largest, wealthiest corporations. By contrast, even the most aggressive use
of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction subjects the defendant to a lawsuit only in a state in
which the defendant has some property, with the defendant’s financial exposure
limited only to the value of the property. Further, owning property in a state
seems inherently to constitute a closer connection to the forum than merely
passing through (much less over state airspace).
If asked to choose between the two regimes, any sane defendant would prefer the more limited risks posed by quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to the vast risk
posed by tag jurisdiction. In Shaffer, the Court realized that the inexorable logic
of International Shoe required that its fairness/reasonableness analysis be applied to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction notwithstanding its historical pedigree and the
general deference given to state territorial boundaries and state hegemony within those boundaries. But somehow Moore v. Lindsay and similar post-Shaffer
cases failed to implement the logic of Shaffer to tag jurisdiction, instead continuing to treat Grace v. MacArthur as authoritative.119
After Burnham, MacArthur was less cited, undoubtedly because proponents of tag jurisdiction now could use the Scalia plurality in Burnham. Nevertheless, MacArthur was still occasionally used to provide further support for the
view that Justice Scalia’s ringing endorsement of service of process as a means

119

See, e.g., Mordelt, 779 F.2d at 265 (5th Cir. 1985) (service within forum confers personal
jurisdiction over served defendant for all matters, citing MacArthur). Mordelt was cited in
eighteen subsequent cases (including Burnham) and in thirty-four law review articles or
notes. Accord Certain British Underwriters at Lloyds v. Jet Charter Serv., Inc., 789 F.2d
1534, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fanello, 662 F.2d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 1981);
Ruggieri v. Gen. Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525, 529 (D. Colo. 1982); McReynolds v.
Mun. Court of Ottumwa, 207 N.W.2d 792, 799 (Iowa 1973); Marsh v. State, 620 P.2d 878,
879 (N.M. 1980); State v. Marsh, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 824 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1980)
(cases approving use of tag jurisdiction and citing MacArthur); see also Opert v. Schmid,
535 F. Supp. 591, 593–94 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (service within forum confers personal jurisdiction over served defendant for all matters) (citing other cases but not citing MacArthur);
Aluminal Indus., Inc., 89 F.R.D. at 329 (same); Cariaga, 762 P.2d at 887 (same); Nutri-West,
764 P.2d at 695–96 (same); Lockert, 361 S.E.2d at 585 (same); Hutto v. Plagens, 330 S.E.2d
341, 342 (Ga. 1985) (same); In re Marriage of Pridemore, 497 N.E.2d 818, 819–20 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (same). But see Nehemiah, 765 F.2d at 47 (service on transient defendant alone not
enough to establish personal jurisdiction); Waffenschmidt v. Mackay, 763 F.2d 711, 714 (5th
Cir. 1985) (same); Harold M. Pitman Co., 626 F. Supp. at 312 (same); Mohler v. Dorado
Wings, Inc., 675 S.W.2d 404, 405–06 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
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of conferring personal jurisdiction constituted black letter law, notwithstanding
International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner.120
The rationale behind the cases finding International Shoe not to have abolished tag jurisdiction was the portion of Chief Justice Stone’s decision in which
he wrote:
[T]he capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or
other form of notice, [and now] due process requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”121

By first focusing on the italicized language, courts wishing to retain broad
tag jurisdiction then argued that where defendants were within the forum state
at the time of service, such defendants remained subject to the traditional territorial power declared in Pennoyer. While such a reading is plausible (even if
erroneously assuming that Justice Stone was envisioning brief, episodic, accidental presence in the forum unrelated to the litigation rather than substantial or
long-standing presence in the forum), it became increasingly hard to justify after Shaffer v. Heitner. But the view remained entrenched, with MacArthur
available both to cite as support and to use as an illustration of the outer limit of
tag jurisdiction. If such assertions of jurisdiction could take place in mid-air,
similar assertions on the ground looked less unreasonable.122
Perhaps more significant has been the reception of Grace v. MacArthur in
secondary literature. It has been cited in seventy legal periodicals. Although
many of these citations are in articles spurred by Burnham rather than MacArthur or the topic of transient jurisdiction per se, and several are critical of MacArthur’s broad notion of transient jurisdiction, all appear to treat the decision as
setting forth a correct statement of the law and the continuing vitality of transient jurisdiction.
Perhaps more important, MacArthur became a near-staple note case contained in civil procedure casebooks and treatises to illustrate the continued
availability of tag jurisdiction. Casebooks often contain reference to Grace v.
MacArthur, usually treating the case as a correct application of the law, albeit
with unusual facts.123 Similarly, major treatises cite MacArthur with approval
as correctly reflecting the law.124
120

See, e.g., Evello Invs., N.V. v. Printed Media Servs., 158 F.R.D. 172, 173 (D. Kan.
1994).
121
See, e.g., Lockert, 361 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945) and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (italics to International
Shoe quotation added by the Lockert court).
122
For example, service on the defendant in Aluminal Indus., Inc., 89 F.R.D. at 329 occurred during the defendant’s brief stopover at an airport in the jurisdiction.
123
See, e.g., CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 55; SUBRIN ET AL., supra note 1; but see FREER
& PERDUE, supra note 1 (no mention of MacArthur); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1
(same); but see MARCUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 688 (referring to MacArthur as “[t]he reduc-
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Even casebooks that do a good job describing the nuances of Burnham125
seem to fall prey to a disturbing tendency to accept the Grace v. MacArthur result and rationale. One recent textbook presents the following illustration and
assessment:
Suppose [a] defendant is returning to his home in Oregon from a trip to
Hawaii. As it approaches Oregon, his airplane passes through northern California, at which point an authorized process-server sitting next to him on the plane
serves him with process—while in the airspace over California. May the California court assert personal jurisdiction? Was the defendant actually physically
present while served?
Analysis: Yes. A defendant who is within the airspace of a state is nonetheless actually physically present in the state for personal jurisdiction purposes.126

This textbook, like almost all others in the field, treats pure tag-style, transient jurisdiction as alive and well.127 But as previously noted and explored in

tio ad absurdum” illustration of tag jurisdiction, commenting that the case “involved no elements of either convenience or submission by the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court”
and rhetorically asking whether “there [is] any persuasive justification” for such an exercise
of personal jurisdiction); see also STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 85–88 (treating MacArthur as authoritative but questioning its continued vitality in light of Shaffer v. Heitner and
the multiple Court opinions in Burnham).
124
See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 168–69 (7th ed. 2004) (through use of tag
jurisdiction “even momentary presence of defendant creates power to adjudicate a claim totally unrelated to that presence”) (citing Grace v. MacArthur and summarizing it as finding
“valid service on defendant flying over state”). One prominent treatise appears to alternate
between (in my view) overreading Burnham, as continued endorsement of tag jurisdiction
and recognizing its constitutional vulnerability, then back to viewing tag jurisdiction as
nonetheless enduring because of inertia and status quo bias:
Shaffer v. Heitner appeared to open jurisdiction based on service within the state (called tag jurisdiction) to constitutional challenge: why should a defendant’s brief presence within a state
warrant the assertion of jurisdiction on an entirely unrelated claim? However, the Court rejected
such a challenge in Burnham . . . . Four Justices found the history of in-state service sufficient to
support its constitutionality, apparently in all cases, and three were willing to construe out of existence Shaffer’s statements that all assertions of state court jurisdiction are subject to International Shoe standards. Four other Justices said only that service on a defendant voluntarily present in a state “as a rule” supports jurisdiction, while the ninth Justice committed himself to no
general rule. It may be, therefore, that [based on the rationale of Shaffer] service based on personal service will yet be held unconstitutional in extreme cases, such as when the defendant is
served while flying across a state. But don’t hold your breath.

HAZARD ET AL., supra note 30, § 3.6 at 124 (footnotes omitted).
125
See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 85–88 describing discussion of Burnham. In that
textbook, from which the ensuing citation of Grace v. MacArthur is derived, the book also
alerts the student: “In Burham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), however, a majority
of the Supreme Court left open the possibility that the assertion of personal jurisdiction
based solely on fleeting presence might be so unfair in some circumstances as to raise constitutional concerns.” See id. at 87.
126
Id. at 88 (citing Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) as an example).
127
See id. at 86–87. One example used in the textbook is of a dancer in a studio on the California-Oregon border who is served while standing partially on the California side of the
dance studio. According to this textbook, the service is effective because “[a] state generally
may assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is actually physically present in the
state as long as the defendant is present while served with process.” Id. at 87. But see id. at
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more detail below regarding Burnham, this strong view of tag jurisdiction had
the support of only four Justices. There was also the de facto opposition of five
members of the Court, or at least the implicit requirement that there be some
additional defendant contact with the forum state.
Of course, not all the blame for the continued judicial allegiance to tag jurisdiction can be placed upon MacArthur. For example, in a decision issued
nearly twenty years after MacArthur and less than a year before Shaffer v.
Heitner, the First Circuit stated without hesitation, “It has long been black letter
law that personal service within its geographical area establishes a court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”128 In that case, defendant Davis and another resident of Vermont were each sued over an alleged contract breach, with
Davis served while “in New Hampshire, concededly on business unconnected
with the partnership [giving rise to the dispute].”129 The trial court granted the
Rule 12(b)(2) motions of both defendants, finding insufficient contact with
New Hampshire. A First Circuit panel unanimously reversed.
Perhaps the appeals court was, as a practical matter, unmoved by the
“plight” of a Vermont defendant having to suffer the “inconvenience” of defending a claim in New Hampshire brought by a company with whom the defendant concededly had business ties.130 But the First Circuit did not expressly
use such practical concerns in making its decision. In fact, the court appeared to
reject any role for fairness and reasonableness analysis in assessing transient
service. It also read International Shoe as a one-way street for plaintiffs seeking
expansive jurisdiction.
The cases relied upon by defendant discussing “fairness,” etc., alleging contra,
are directed either to the fairness of the basis for substituted service when an individual was not personally served or present within the area, or to the fairness
of subjecting a foreign intangible entity, such as a corporation, to the jurisdiction
of the court. The concern, in other words, was with expanding jurisdiction beyond traditional limits, not with contracting it.131

The First Circuit was dismissive of what, forty years later, still looks like a
persuasive argument against the slavish embrace of tag jurisdiction and some
symmetry of treatment between individual defendants and entity defendants.132
The Davis court continued,
85–88 (noting that this same textbook points out that Burnham does not necessarily support
either the Grace v. MacArthur result or the interstate dance floor hypothetical).
128
Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 1976) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1969)).
129
Id. at 419.
130
Cf. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1976) (striking down New Hampshire’s requirement that bar admission applicants be state residents, noting that applicant
Piper, a Vermont resident, lived only 400 yards from the New Hampshire border).
131
Donald Manter Co., 543 F.2d at 420 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423
F.2d 584 (1st Cir. 1970)).
132
Commenting on the trial court’s dismissal, the First Circuit stated:
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Nor will we adopt the suggestion, advanced by some commentators, but unsupported by any judicial authority, that an individual’s mere presence within the
jurisdiction is not enough to subject him to the court’s process. As to this, we
consider it particularly unacceptable to say that an action not in rem must be
brought in the defendant’s residence to the exclusion of the plaintiff’s. Rather,
even on the limited subject of venue, it is frequently said that, at least in the absence of a showing of harassment, the party who brings the suit should be the
one to choose the forum.133

The First Circuit’s approach arguably presaged the Scalia approach in
Burnham in that it is both hidebound regarding perceived tradition and a bit selective in its use of source materials. For example, the full text of Section 28 of
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws states that tag jurisdiction (as of
1969, prior to Shaffer v. Heitner) was valid unless the exercise of jurisdiction
would be unfair to the defendant.134 For reasons never explained, the panel fails
to quote the Restatement accurately and to grapple with its meaning. The appellate court’s one nod to fairness (and it may in practice be a significant one) was
to note the ready availability of venue transfer in apt cases.135
II. BURNHAM
Thus, as of the later twentieth century, the judicial revolution in personal
jurisdiction was incomplete. Minimum contacts analysis displaced territoriality
as the primary concern in exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in matters related to the substance of the litigation. Also, a modified
It is not clear from the district court’s opinion which of these principles it relied on as making the black letter law [that service within the forum state is conclusive as to personal jurisdiction] outmoded. At one point it stated that an individual personally served within the jurisdiction
is entitled to the same “fairness” treatment that would be accorded a foreign corporation not doing business within the state. At another point it spoke as if partnerships were legal entities, and
thus subject to the corporation test. Neither position is correct.

Id. at 420. The appellate panel then went on to note that partnerships and corporations are
treated differently under the law regarding amenability to suit. But it is hard to see how any
error by the district court in this regard made its fairness analysis infirm. Corporations—
unlike individuals who receive less judicial protection in this regard—cannot be sued by service within the jurisdiction upon even high-ranking corporate officials unless they are specifically designated as agents for purposes of receiving service.
133
Id. (citations omitted). In addition to citing inconvenient venue precedent (Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) and Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22 (3d Cir.
1970)), the panel cited Albert Ehrenzweig’s famous article and an almost equally prominent
project examining jurisdiction. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 40, at 289; Developments in the
Law, supra note 46, at 937–39. It is a bit harsh for the First Circuit to argue that the suggestion of subjecting tag jurisdiction to the fairness/reasonableness prong of minimum contacts
analysis is “unsupported by any judicial authority” given International Shoe, which is easily
susceptible to such a reading. The Court’s Shaffer v. Heitner decision a year later, of course,
is also substantial judicial authority that has not been overturned by Burnham.
134
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1969).
135
Donald Manter Co., 543 F.2d at 420 (“Any legitimate showing a defendant may make as
to fairness in this regard is fully cognizable under the change of venue statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), without impinging on an established principle of jurisdiction. Dismissing the action altogether is overkill.”).
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form of minimum contacts became the touchstone for exercises of general personal jurisdiction as well. Along with this shift came a recognition that in rem
and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction must also be assessed by the yardstick of due process. Except for issues of siting the location of intangible property, in rem jurisdiction almost tautologically met the test in that if property is in the forum
state, there is logically sufficient contact to permit the forum state to adjudicate
matters concerning the property (but not all legal rights affecting those interested in the property).
As the Court declared in Shaffer v. Heitner, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, in
which the property is not at issue save as a means of notifying and subjecting
the defendant to state power, logically must satisfy the fairness/reasonableness
inquiry demanded by International Shoe. Many commentators had also largely
recognized that tag jurisdiction was similarly logically subject to minimum
contacts analysis,136 as had some courts,137 although most courts had failed to
examine the issue or had affirmed the vitality of tag jurisdiction since it had not
been expressly forbidden in Shaffer.138 This discrepancy set the stage for a clarifying pronouncement by the Supreme Court. Instead, it delivered a fragmented
opinion that has frequently been misunderstood and, at least as widely construed, undermined the due process analysis of personal jurisdiction.
Dennis and Francie Burnham married in 1976 in West Virginia and moved
to New Jersey in 1977, where their two children were born. The couple separated in July 1987 and agreed that Francie would have custody of the children
and could move with them to California.139 They had apparently agreed that
Francie would file for divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. How136
See, e.g., Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 18, 25 (1982); Daniel O. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25
VILL. L. REV. 38, 39–40 (1980); Bruce Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction
After World-Wide and the Abolition of the “Gotcha” Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 743–48
(1981); Vernon, supra note 82, at 302–03; see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064 (3d ed. 2002) (leading treatise questions continued viability of transient jurisdiction after Shaffer).
137
See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Cong. of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46–47 (3d Cir. 1985)
(Shaffer v. Heitner “signaled [judicial] reexamination of some of the traditional underpinnings of jurisdiction. . . . If the mere presence of property cannot support quasi in rem jurisdiction, it is difficult to find a basis in logic and fairness to conclude that the more fleeting
physical presence of a non-resident person can support personal jurisdiction.”); Harold M.
Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 311–13 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“[U]nder
Shaffer, mere service of process upon a defendant transiently present in the jurisdiction does
not vest a state with personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”); see also id. at 312: “Personal
service within the jurisdiction is not the litmus test for proper in personam jurisdiction. Rather, the test is whether the defendant has had minimum contacts with the forum ‘such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
138
See supra notes 111–35, citing cases affirming tag jurisdiction notwithstanding arguments that basing personal jurisdiction on service in the forum state alone violates International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner.
139
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607 (1990).
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ever, in October 1987, Dennis filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of
desertion. Francie objected to this new tactic by Dennis and sued for divorce in
California state court in early 1988.140 Later that month, Dennis visited southern California on business. He then visited his children in the San Francisco area, where Francie now resided, taking the older child into the city for the weekend. When he returned the child to Francie’s home, Dennis was served with a
California court summons and divorce petition.141
Notwithstanding the couple’s earlier agreement about Francie and the children moving to California, Dennis objected to divorce in California and moved
to have the case dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. His contacts with
California consisted of several short business trips and trips to see his children.142 The California trial court denied his motion, and the state Court of Appeals denied his petition for mandamus relief, ruling that because Dennis was
personally served in the state, he was subject to its jurisdiction.143 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the question of whether a state court could exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the sole basis of in-state service of
process alone.
In an opinion announcing the Court’s holding, Justice Scalia (joined by
Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy) issued an opinion taking the view that pure
territorial exercise of transient jurisdiction had indeed survived both International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner.
Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in
American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State. The view developed early that
each State had the power to hale before its courts any individual who could be
found within its borders, and that once having acquired jurisdiction over such a
person by properly serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction
to enter judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit.144
* * *
This American jurisdictional practice is, moreover, not merely old; it is
continuing. It remains the practice . . . as far as we are aware [of] all the States
and the Federal Government—if one disregards (as one must for this purpose)
the few opinions since 1978 that have erroneously said, on grounds similar to
those that petitioner presses here, that this Court’s due process decisions render
the practice unconstitutional. We do not know of a single state or federal statute,
or a single judicial decision resting upon state law, that has abandoned in-state
service as a basis of jurisdiction. Many recent cases reaffirm it.145
140

Id. at 607–08.
Id. at 608.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 610–11.
145
Id. at 615 (citations omitted). The Scalia opinion essentially assumes away the challenge
to tag jurisdiction by largely taking the view that if most courts have not read Shaffer v.
Heitner to require a due process analysis of tag jurisdiction just as for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, this automatically makes any such argument unpersuasive. Justice Scalia then labels the
141
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Although reading Shaffer v. Heitner more narrowly than many commentators as a means of avoiding a due process inquiry about tag jurisdiction, those
joining the Scalia opinion took an approach to due process different from that
of Shaffer, and for that matter International Shoe. The Court “conducted no independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule, leaving that judgment to the legislatures that are free to amend it; for
our purposes, its validation is its pedigree, as the phrase ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice’ makes clear.”146
Justice White joined in the Scalia opinion except as to Part III, which was
largely a criticism of Justice Brennan and his approach to the issue, and further
stated:
The rule allowing jurisdiction to be obtained over a nonresident by personal service in the forum State, without more, has been and is so widely accepted
throughout this country that I could not possibly strike it down, either on its face
or as applied in this case, on the ground that it denies due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court has the authority under
the Amendment to examine even traditionally accepted procedures and declare
them invalid, there has been no showing here or elsewhere that as a general
proposition the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances that it should be held violative of due process in every case. . . . Here,
personal service in California, without more, is enough, and I agree that the
judgment should be affirmed.147

A critic might respond that this same reasoning, if used in Shaffer v. Heitner, would have counseled against invalidating quasi-in-rem jurisdiction—but
Justice White joined the majority opinion in Shaffer without qualification. A
critic might also wonder whether he really meant to so broadly embrace tag jurisdiction. For example, if Francie Burnham had moved with the kids to Nevada, would personal jurisdiction based only on service upon Dennis while he
was changing planes at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas have satisfied due process? The text of Justice White’s opinion literally supports this, but such a
strained result is at odds with the Justice’s generally pragmatic approach and
willingness to seek practical results even if it means some conflict with doctrine
or precedent.148
argument about due process applying to all exercises of personal jurisdiction as one that
“rests on a thorough misunderstanding of our cases.” Id. at 616. But as this article’s earlier
discussion of Shaffer v. Heitner suggests, it is at a minimum very hard to square Shaffer with
the continued use of tag jurisdiction that is immune from any due process review. The Scalia
opinion read Shaffer as preserving the distinction between “physically present defendants”
and “absent” ones, stating that “our tradition has treated the two classes of defendants quite
differently, and it is unreasonable to read Shaffer as casually obliterating that distinction.” Id.
at 621. Scholars criticizing Burnham questioned Justice Scalia’s reading of Shaffer and other
due process/process precedents.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
148
See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92–94 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting) (taking view that formal niceties regarding different status of judges
appointed pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than Article III should not prevent
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Even assuming Justice White was this adamant about the immunity of tag
jurisdiction from fairness analysis, and Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy were
as adamant as the clearly committed, almost strident Justice Scalia, this still
makes for only four votes in support of the view that tag jurisdiction need never
be subject to a fairness/reasonableness inquiry. Looking at the remainder of the
Court in Burnham, it appears that this strong view of tag jurisdiction could not
command a fifth vote.
Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
O’Connor, rejected the view that service within the forum alone established
personal jurisdiction.
I agree [that the Due Process Clause] generally permits a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if he is served with process while voluntarily
present in the forum State. . . . [However,] I would undertake an “independent
inquiry into the . . . fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule.” [citing to the
Scalia opinion rejecting this obligation]. I therefore concur only in the judgment.
[Further,] the approach adopted by Justice Scalia’s opinion today—reliance
solely on historical pedigree—is foreclosed by our decisions in [International
Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner].149

Notwithstanding this reluctance to embrace an unquestioned deference to
service in the forum as a basis for personal jurisdiction, the Brennan opinion
concurred in the result. Specifically, Justice Brennan agreed that Dennis should
be subject to California jurisdiction because his overall amount of contacts with
the state was sufficient, particularly since visits with the children was contact
related to the couple’s marital issues.150
Thus, on the issue of whether service alone could support personal jurisdiction, there appeared to be four votes solidly saying “yes” and four votes rather
solidly saying “no” (but finding personal jurisdiction over Dennis nonetheless).
bankruptcy judges from being able to make determinations necessary to efficient administration of debtors’ estates).
149
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628–29 (Brennan, J., concurring).
150
Id. at 637–39. Critics of the Brennan concurrence tend to focus on this part of the opinion, as did Justice Scalia in attacking the Brennan concurrence in Part III of Scalia’s own
concurrence (the portion Justice White did not join). The critical perspective is that Justice
Brennan strained to find sufficient minimum contacts by treating Burnham’s use of state
roads and enjoyment of the state infrastructure of police and fire protection or medical care if
needed. Although the critics of course have a point about the relatively light benefits of the
forum state enjoyed by Burnham on this short visit aimed primarily at visiting his children,
these are contacts nonetheless—and unlike merely flying above a state’s airspace—convey
at least some benefits to a defendant. Dennis Burnham, in particular, was doing business in
California, although apparently not a great quantity. But he likely derived economic benefit
from his contact with California. And he was being sued over a divorce sought in California
by a California resident and apparent domiciliary, who was raising Burnham’s kids in California. Collectively, this is not a trivial set of contacts to combine with service, which should
count as a contact even under a regime where it does automatically establish personal jurisdiction. Under the uniform, due process-centered model of personal jurisdiction suggested at
the close of this article, these factors would logically support the Burnham Court’s result,
even if rejecting the four-member Scalia plurality.
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Justice Stevens wrote separately, supporting the exercise of jurisdiction but
wishing to avoid broad pronouncements.
[That] concern prevents me from joining either Justice Scalia’s or Justice Brennan’s opinion in this case. For me, it is sufficient to note that the historical evidence and consensus identified by Justice Scalia, the considerations of fairness
identified by Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by Justice
White, all combine to demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy case. Accordingly, I agree that the judgment [subjecting Dennis to personal jurisdiction in
California] should be affirmed.151

Prophetically, in a footnote to his concurrence, Justice Stevens made the
statement set forth at the beginning of this article: “Perhaps the adage about
hard cases making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases.”152 In the aftermath of Burnham, commentators and lower courts struggled a bit to discern
exactly what the Court had said. Although four of nine justices were willing to
support continued use of broad transient jurisdiction via service within the forum, it appeared that at least four and probably five justices saw this as insufficient standing alone. Nevertheless, despite the fragmentation of the Burnham
Court, most lower courts appear to have treated Burnham as an affirmation of
tag jurisdiction.153
Many commentators were careful not to read Burnham too broadly and
noted that exercise of personal jurisdiction probably would require something

151

Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 640 n.*.
153
See, e.g., First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20–21 (2d Cir. 1998)
(treating service alone as sufficient to confer jurisdiction because defendants “knew, or
should have known, that by” going to meeting in New York, they were “risking exposure to
personal jurisdiction” in the state (citing Burnham)); Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth.,
400 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (tag jurisdiction or “personal service on an individual within the state” endures as “a valid method of acquiring personal jurisdiction over an
individual”) (although this may also be a case where extenuating circumstances would support use of tag jurisdiction in the absence of the practical availability of another forum where
relief can be obtained); In re Order Quashing Deposition Subpoenas, No. 1:02CV00054,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14928, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that pursuant to Burnham,
“an individual may be subjected to liability by the exercise of so-called ‘tag’ jurisdiction far
from home without the Due Process Clause being violated”); In re Marriage of Vailas, 939
N.E.2d 565, 570–71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (although finding Burnham not controlling because
state long-arm statute does not reach to full extent of constitutional due process, finds that
“the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Burnham, ‘[a]mong the most firmly established principles
of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction
over nonresidents who are physically present in the State’ ” (citing the Scalia opinion in
Burnham but failing to note that it was joined by only two other Justices)); Schinkel v. MaxiHolding, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (similar treatment of Burnham). See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 108.51 (3d ed.
2014) (“In practice, however, [Burnham] makes clear that a challenge to jurisdiction based
on due process grounds by a defendant who was personally served while physically present
in the state will rarely, if ever, be successful” and citing post-Burnham cases are consistent
with that view).
152
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more than only service on a transient defendant.154 Some commentators were
highly critical of Burnham’s failure to follow Shaffer’s lead and to bring tag
jurisdiction firmly under the umbrella of the minimum contacts considerations
of fairness and reasonableness.155 These same commentators were often particularly critical of the highly formalist, frozen-in-history Scalia opinion that
treated pre-International Shoe understandings as determinative but gave short
shrift to International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner.156
But many commentators, and in particular law student study aids, overread
Burnham as a ringing endorsement of tag jurisdiction by a majority of the
Court or at least a widespread consensus to leave tag jurisdiction in place.157
154

Despite the judicial embrace of tag jurisdiction as unproblematic, many mainstream
commentators have tried to advise bench and bar that the Scalia position in Burnham only
enjoyed the support of 3–4 justices, with five arguably opposed. For example, Moore’s Federal Practice (§ 108.51) offers a nuanced reading of the decision, but one that nonetheless is
excessively slanted toward reading Burnham as endorsing tag jurisdiction.
In [Burnham], the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of jurisdiction based
on personal service of process on a transient nonresident while that person is physically present
in the state. However, the Court split 4-4 on whether jurisdiction based on service of process
could be justified by its historical pedigree or required a minimum contacts and fairness analysis.
Justices Stevens wrote a separate opinion, declining to agree with either side.

16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 153 (footnotes omitted). As noted above, my view is that a
sounder reading of the Stevens concurrence is that he is not willing to uphold jurisdiction
(over Dennis Burnham or anyone else) based solely on service of process within the forum
state—otherwise, he would have joined the Scalia or White opinions. There was no reason to
write separately, even briefly, unless he was unprepared to uphold California’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction in the absence of defendant’s other contacts with the forum state. See
supra note 151 and accompanying text; see also Christine M. Daleiden, Comment, The Aftermath of Burnham v. Superior Court: A New Rule of Transient Jurisdiction?, 32 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 989, 990–92 (1992) (reading Burnham’s multiple opinions in similar manner).
155
See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1990); Stanley
E. Cox, Would That Burnham Had Not Come to Be Done Insane! A Critique of Recent Supreme Court Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning, An Explanation of Why Transient Presence
Jurisdiction is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts About Divorce Jurisdiction in a Minimum Contacts World, 58 TENN. L. REV. 497 (1991); Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of
California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: Due Process and Constitutional Theory After Burnham v. Superior
Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675 (1991); Allan R. Stein, Burnham and the Death of Theory in the
Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 597 (1991); Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 611 (1991); Barbara Surtees
Goto, Note, International Shoe Gets the Boot: Burnham v. Superior Court Resurrects the
Physical Power Theory, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 851 (1991); Paul C. Wilson, Note, A Pedigree
for Due Process?, 56 MO. L. REV. 353 (1991).
156
See, e.g., supra note 155.
157
See, e.g., STEVEN L. EMANUEL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 29–30 (5th ed. 2011) (on the authority
of Burnham, personal jurisdiction “may be exercised over an individual by virtue of his
presence within the forum state . . . even if the individual is an out-of-state resident who
comes into the forum state only briefly . . . as long as service was made on him” while in the
forum state) (using facts of Burnham as illustrative example); JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 8 (7th ed. 2013) (personal “jurisdiction based on
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service of process on the defendant within the state . . . was reaffirmed in Burnham”); id. at
16 (“[T]he Supreme Court concluded that such ‘transient jurisdiction’ is still a valid means
of obtaining jurisdiction over an individual defendant, even if the defendant is in the state
briefly or for reasons unrelated to the litigation.”) (citing Burnham and using example of establishing jurisdiction by having process server anticipate prospective defendant’s trip to
state); LINDA S. MULLENIX, CIVIL PROCEDURE 254 (2d ed. 2014) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner has not modified the doctrine of transient jurisdiction. Assertions
of transient jurisdiction . . . do not have to satisfy International Shoe minimum contacts jurisprudence.”) (citing Burnham and referring to “Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion” in the
case, although discussing other opinions); Cox, supra note 155, at 518 (“Burnham is most
glaringly wrong, however, in its primary conclusion, shared by all the Justices, that transient
presence jurisdiction is under most circumstances constitutional.”); Goto, supra note 155, at
887 (In Burnham, “[t]he Court’s clear message is that the physical power theory comports
with due process—regardless of which due process analysis is applied.”); Scott D. Irwin,
Note, Burnham v. Superior Court of California: The Final Word on Transient Personal Jurisdiction?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 613, 628–30 (1992) (summarizing and assessing case with almost no mention of White and Stevens concurrences and characterizing Burnham as having
endorsed classic pre-International Shoe use of tag jurisdiction); Douglas A. Mays, Note,
Burnham v. Superior Court: The Supreme Court Agrees on Transient Jurisdiction in Practice, but Not in Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1271 (1991) (similarly overbroad characterization of
Burnham, treating divergent opinions as divided regarding analysis but not in basic support
for tag jurisdiction). The Clermont Civil Procedure student hornbook appears to describe
pure tag jurisdiction as good law even while suggesting some concern:
[E]ven momentary presence of defendant creates power to adjudicate a claim totally unrelated to
that presence. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (valid service on defendant flying over state).
Example: D, a Minnesotan driving to Maine for a vacation, stops at a gas station in
Vermont. While waiting in line there, D assaults P, who is a businessman from Ohio. P
sues D in an Ohio state court, managing to serve D with process when D stops for the
night in Ohio on a later trip to New York. (Result: such “transient jurisdiction” is constitutional.)
Burnham . . . seems to suggest that transient jurisdiction merely by its historical pedigree
satisfies any reasonableness test. (Despite former attempts fictitiously to apply the “presence”
concept to corporations, the view today is that this basis meaningfully refers only to jurisdiction
over individuals, since only individuals can be physically present.)

KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 171 (9th ed. 2012); see also Deborah
Maranville, Sample Gold Standard Brief, Burnham v. Superior Court, available at
http://courses.washington.edu/civpro04/BurnhamGoldStdBrief.doc (law professor’s sample
exemplary case brief for students studying civil procedure describes Burnham as a case holding that it does not violate due process for a court to “assume personal jurisdiction over a
[nonresident, non-domiciliary] defendant based on his physical presence in the State” even
where the suit is “unrelated” to his activities in the state (although this summary arguably
becomes a bit more nuanced in that it notes that the defendant was in the state for business
and to visit with children rather than merely passing through)). But see SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 113–15 (3d ed. 2012) (reading Burnham as maintaining viability of tag jurisdiction but criticizing case as jurisprudential step backwards):
[In Burnham], the Court could have, and arguably should have, applied the Asahi due process
balancing test to determine whether burdens outweighed interests or vice versa. . . . The case
would have been difficult under the Asahi balancing test, but the balance likely would have
tipped in favor of jurisdiction, on the ground that the state’s interest in providing for the best interests of the children trumped all other considerations. But this was not the basis for decision.
None of the Justices faithfully applied the balancing test set out in Asahi; they instead turned to
formalistic analyses reminiscent either of the 1877 Pennoyer ruling that in-state service alone
sufficed for a state to assert jurisdiction, or of Burger King’s mechanical application of the minimum contacts test.
The court fractured and there was no controlling opinion. [Going on to describe differing
opinions in some detail].
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Although it is hardly the greatest problem in modern jurisprudence or legal
education, the ravages of reading Burnham as a broad endorsement of “pure”
tag jurisdiction unaccompanied by any other defendant contact with the forum
state are readily apparent at final exam time. Students routinely treat Burnham
(at least at the three law schools where I have taught) as standing for the proposition that service in the forum alone without question confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant. They do this even in the total absence of any other
connection to the forum state, which is a position that has yet to garner the support of five or more Supreme Court Justices in the post-International Shoe era.
Because so many tag jurisdiction cases also involve other defendant contacts with the forum state, lower courts were still normally able to make defensible and probably correct decisions exercising jurisdiction where service within the state was a key component. Outside of “poster child” cases of highly
strained applications of tag jurisdiction, such as MacArthur, most exercises of
tag jurisdiction would perhaps also satisfy a reasonable minimum contacts
analysis. Nonetheless, the mere availability of pure tag jurisdiction stands in
stark contrast to the regime of due process and fairness analysis that has otherwise dominated personal jurisdiction analysis for decades.
III. GOODYEAR, NICASTRO, DAIMLER, AND WALDEN V. FIORE
For twenty years after Burnham, the Supreme Court had a relatively heavy
docket of personal jurisdiction cases during the 1977–1990 time period, but decided no significant personal jurisdiction cases. Due to misreading by lawyers,
judges, and commentators (particularly study aid outlines), Burnham became
known as the case that presented tag jurisdiction as “the law.” Although the
truth was far more complicated and the decision widely disliked by academics,
Burnham came to stand for the continuing solvency of transient jurisdiction. As
such, it appeared to have avoided the fate of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, which
fell into relative disuse after Shaffer v. Heitner. When the Court returned to deciding personal jurisdiction cases, it did so in a manner that made the always
troublesome prevailing view of Burnham even less defensible.
In 2011, personal jurisdiction returned with a vengeance, as the Court decided two prominent personal jurisdiction cases, one involving general jurisdiction and the other specific jurisdiction. Both decisions slanted in favor of restrictive jurisdiction. In doing so, they further undercut the argument that tag
jurisdiction was so exceptional that it should be beyond the reach of the due
process minimum contacts analysis governing the rest of the personal jurisdicAfter decades of developing a modern due process analysis for the problems of a mobile
population, the Court’s retreat to formalism was quite troubling. Allowing tag jurisdiction to
hold up, virtually regardless of the contacts with the forum, invites gamesmanship in litigation
and dictates that parties exercise caution in where they travel for fear of being served in an inconvenient or inhospitable forum. This unfortunate outcome is another example of Pennoyer’s
inapplicability in a mobile society, which every case from International Shoe to Asahi had attempted to resolve.

Id.
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tion world. The Court continued in this vein in 2014, issuing another restrictive
general personal jurisdiction decision, along with a specific personal jurisdiction decision that, although not particularly controversial, continued in the vein
of refusing to expand specific jurisdiction beyond its current bounds.
A. Goodyear
Goodyear158 began with when a North Carolina youth soccer club took a
European trip in 2004. As a bus was taking the group to the Paris airport for a
flight home, a tire blew out, causing an accident that killed two thirteen-yearold North Carolinians. Their bereaved parents, also North Carolinians, sought
compensation in their home state courts. Named as defendants were Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., and three subsidiaries of which parent Goodyear owned
100 percent of the stock. A Turkish subsidiary had manufactured the allegedly
defective tire, and the other subsidiaries had been involved in the distribution of
the tire.159 All three subsidiaries contested North Carolina’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over them (parent Goodyear did not) but were unsuccessful.160
Because the bus accident, the alleged negligence in tire manufacturing, and
the boys’ deaths all occurred outside North Carolina, plaintiff asserted general
personal jurisdiction. Under Court precedent, general personal jurisdiction required that a defendant have sufficiently “continuous and systematic” contacts
with the forum state to make it apt for the defendant to be sued in the state over
any claim, regardless of where the claim arose.161 The Goodyear Court, in a
unanimous decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, held that the three subsidiaries lacked such sufficient contact with the forum state even though “tens of
thousands” of the subsidiary’s tires (out of “tens of millions” manufactured by
the company) “were distributed within North Carolina by other Goodyear USA
affiliates.” The subsidiary’s tires “were typically custom ordered to equip specialized vehicles such as cement mixers, waste haulers, and boat and horse
trailers.”162
The Court reasoned that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction required more in the way of volitional, consistent conduct specifically directed at
or associated with the forum state than mere sales or distribution of products.
Noting that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile” and that “for a corporation, it is an
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home,”
158

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
Id. at 2850–52. For a more detailed presentation of the facts from one of plaintiffs’ attorneys who emphasizes parent Goodyear’s control over the subsidiaries and their products, see
Collyn A. Peddie, Mi Case Es Su Casa: Enterprise Theory and General Jurisdiction over
Foreign Corporations After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 697, 699–702 (2012).
160
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2852.
161
Id. at 2853–54.
162
Id. at 2852.
159
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the Court found it improper for North Carolina to exercise general jurisdiction.163
With its emphasis on the corporate “home,” Goodyear can be read as suggesting that a company’s state of incorporation and its state of corporate headquarters are likely to be the only forums where there is sufficiently weighty
continuous and systematic contact to support general jurisdiction.164 At a minimum, Goodyear rejected establishment of general jurisdiction merely based on
the defendant’s participation in commerce touching upon or even directed at
the forum state.165
B. Nicastro
In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,166 the Court faced the issue of
whether an English punch press manufacturer had sufficient contact with New
Jersey to support specific personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Nicastro, a New Jersey
resident, lost four fingers while using a McIntyre punch press at work. Understandably, he sought to pursue legal relief in his convenient home state.167
McIntyre had intentionally engaged in substantial marketing, sales, and distribution efforts in the United States, but none had specifically targeted New Jersey. As a result, the Court, in a 6–3 decision, ruled that New Jersey lacked per163

Id. at 2853–54.
Id. at 2856 (“A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not
enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.’ ” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945))); see also
Twitchell, supra note 52, at 667 (advocating similar approach to exercise of general jurisdiction).
165
131 S. Ct. at 2854–55.
166
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
167
There is no hint of any forum shopping in the case (other than that the plaintiff wanted to
sue in his home state, hardly a nefarious goal). Although New Jersey is not considered a prodefendant state in terms of product liability law, neither is it considered a “judicial hellhole”
by defendants. The term is taken from the manufacturer-supported lobby group the American Tort Reform Association and its sibling the American Tort Reform Foundation, which
annually present a list of its perceived dozen worst locations to be tort defendant, labeling
these alleged pro-plaintiff jurisdictions as “judicial hellholes.” See JUDICIAL HELLHOLES,
http://www.judicialhellholes.org (last visited May 1, 2015) (a website maintained by the
American Tort Reform Foundation that lists jurisdictions deemed excessively favorable to
plaintiff tort claims). Examples of “Top Six” jurisdictions are California, Louisiana, New
York City, West Virginia, Madison & St. Clair Counties in Illinois, and South Florida. See
AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2013/2014, at 7–24 (2013),
http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/JudicialHellholes-2013.pdf.
Putting aside the obvious political slant of ATRA and ATRF in maintaining this list and the
essentially misleading nature of labeling an entire state pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant (much
variance in this regard is local based on trial judges and juries), it appears that in the roughly
twenty years of this project that New Jersey sites have not incurred the wrath of the organization. See, e.g., id. at 47 (questioning New Jersey appellate court decision permitting lawsuit against phone texters allegedly contributing to auto accident); id. at 50 (praising New
Jersey Supreme Court decision regarding minimum qualifications for medical expert witnesses).
164
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sonal jurisdiction over McIntyre, even though the allegedly defective punch
press’s journey to the Garden State was not very attenuated and appeared to be
reasonably foreseeable.168
Nicastro can be viewed as consistent with the Court’s pre-1990s personal
jurisdiction cases such as Asahi Metal and World-Wide Volkswagen, which
constricted perceived excesses of jurisdictional exercise in lower courts. Nevertheless, it is arguably a more restrictive view of specific personal jurisdiction
and volitional commercial contacts than the “stream of commerce” and “tort
out/harm in” approaches leading to findings of personal jurisdiction in the
Court’s 1980s cases of Burger King v. Rudzewicz, Keeton v. Hustler, Calder v.
Jones, and many lower court cases.169
Much has been written about Nicastro, most of it negative,170 and Nicastro
will not be analyzed at length here except to point out that, to the extent the
reach of specific jurisdiction shrinks, this necessarily adds further fuel to the
argument that tag jurisdiction based on service alone is inconsistent with personal jurisdiction doctrine as a whole. How, one might ask rhetorically, can the
current Court have such misgivings about a state’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over a commercial actor seeking to sell the product that allegedly caused
injury to a state resident, and not harbor similar misgivings about subjecting a
nonresident defendant to jurisdiction regarding any matter on the sole basis of
service of process while the defendant was merely passing briefly through the
state?
C. Daimler
In 2014, the Court again addressed general jurisdiction in Daimler AG v.
Bauman.171 As in Goodyear, the case involved unusual facts and an arguable
overreach by plaintiffs. This raised some question about whether the restrictive
language in the Court’s Goodyear opinion would be applied literally to more
modest attempts to assert general jurisdiction over a defendant with substantial
business operations in a state other than its managerial nerve center or place of
168

Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785.
See supra notes 7–16, 51–52, and accompanying text. See generally STEMPEL ET AL.,
LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (reviewing evolution of Supreme Court
personal jurisdiction doctrine and cases noted in above).
170
See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of
the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245 (2011); Robin J. Effron, Letting the
Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction,
16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867 (2012); Allan Ides, Foreward: A Critical Appraisal of the
Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
341 (2012); Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 745 (2012); Peter R. Bryce, Note, Whither Fairness? In Search of a Jurisdictional Test
After J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2975 (2012); Kristianna L.
Sciarra, Note, A Gap in Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning: An Analysis of J. McIntryre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 195 (2013).
171
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
169
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incorporation. In tandem, Goodyear and Daimler provide defense counsel with
powerful precedent for seeking to avoid the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over a corporation anywhere but in those two locales.
Daimler began as a claim brought by the representatives of labor activists
who had been tortured and killed during Argentina’s “Dirty War” from 1976–
1983. The Argentine subsidiary of Daimler, maker of the Mercedes-Benz automobile, allegedly collaborated with state security forces in these human rights
violations. Plaintiffs sued Daimler in California, with personal jurisdiction
“predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
(MBUSA), a subsidiary of Daimler incorporated in Delaware with its principal
place of business in New Jersey.”172 MBUSA is Daimler’s U.S. distributor and
conducts substantial regular business activity in California.
Plaintiffs asserted that Daimler was subject to California jurisdiction because of its role as parent of MBUSA due to the subsidiary’s substantial business presence in California. Additionally, plaintiffs claimed that Daimler was
liable to plaintiffs pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 because of its status
as parent of the Argentine subsidiary.173 The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ jurisdictional contentions, but a Ninth Circuit panel, after initially affirming, subsequently reversed, with rehearing en banc denied by a divided Appeals Court.
The Ninth Circuit found the agency relationship between Daimler and its subsidiaries sufficient, and it did not require plaintiffs to break through the presumptive corporate veil of the different (but related) corporate entities.174 Ordinarily, piercing the corporate veil requires demonstrating that Daimler
dominated the subsidiaries sufficiently to constitute a situation in which the
subsidiaries were alter egos of the parent company.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, finding that general
personal jurisdiction was not established by the substantial Mercedes-Benz
presence in California.
The Ninth Circuit’s agency finding rested primarily on its observation that
MBUSA’s services were “important” to Daimler, as gauged by Daimler’s hypothetical readiness to perform those services itself if MBUSA did not exist. Formulated this way, the inquiry into importance stacks the deck, for it will always
yield a pro-jurisdiction answer . . . . The Ninth Circuit’s agency theory thus appears to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have
an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond even the
“sprawling view of general jurisdiction” we rejected in Goodyear.175

Repeating language used in Goodyear, the Daimler Court found that the
traditional requirement of “continuous and systematic” presence in a forum

172
173
174
175

Id. at 751.
See id. at 751–52.
See id. at 753.
Id. at 759–60.
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state required that the defendant be “at home” in the forum state for general jurisdiction to be exercised. Further, according to the Daimler Court,
Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will
render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there. “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” . . .
[However,] Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal
place of business; it simply typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums.
Plaintiffs would have us look beyond the exemplar bases Goodyear identified,
and approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business”
[citing Plaintiffs’ brief]. That formulation, we hold, is unacceptably grasping.176

The Daimler Court also stressed the importance of having clear and predictable standards for general personal jurisdiction to facilitate business planning. Further, the Court found that concerns of international comity arose when
U.S. courts attempt to exercise general jurisdiction over foreign defendants.
Other nations, including Daimler’s home country of Germany, simply do not
have the broad notions of long-arm personal jurisdiction prevailing in the United States.177 Without some significant defendant contact in the forum state related to the substantive claim, exercise of jurisdiction in a state other than the
defendant’s corporate “home” was viewed as unfair and out of sync with prevailing international standards.
It may be that after Goodyear and Daimler, general jurisdiction is, as a
practical matter, only available in a business’s state of incorporation and state
of managerial headquarters. But because the issue of jurisdictional presence in
the case was so intertwined with the agency question of whether a subsidiary’s
activity was attributable to the Daimler parent company, it is a bit difficult to
know the reach of Daimler. As a general rule, these two “homes” of the corporation are probably the exclusive sources of general jurisdiction. However, in
more compelling cases, courts may be more inclined to exercise general jurisdiction.
For example, if a patron eats a tainted Big Mac at a McDonald’s on the last
day of a Florida vacation before returning to Ohio and then is afflicted with
food poisoning, would Goodyear and Daimler prevent the exercise of general
jurisdiction over the parent company (assuming that there was a non-frivolous
176

Id. at 760–61.
Id. at 763. (“The Ninth Circuit, moreover, paid little heed to the risks to international
comity its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed. Other nations do not share the uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case. In
the European Union, for example, a corporation may generally be sued in the nation in
which it is ‘domiciled,’ a term defined to refer only to the location of the corporation’s ‘statutory seat,’ ‘central administration,’ or ‘principal place of business.’ ”). The Court also noted
the U.S. Government’s brief in support of Daimler on these grounds.
177
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claim of parent company liability for the food poisoning) in Ohio in spite of the
many Golden Arches one sees throughout the state? But most every hypothetical one could conjure creates a colorable case for specific jurisdiction as well
by involving some connection between the defendant, the action, and the forum
state—or at least involving a plaintiff connected to the forum state.178 For example, in the McDonald’s food poisoning hypothetical, the plaintiff is from
Ohio, the consequences of the food poisoning are felt in Ohio, and a company
that has built a national brand can reasonably expect that consumers will buy
their products in one state but consume (and certainly digest) them in other
states. People have been known to grab burgers on the way to the airport or at
the airport but not eat them (or suffer from them) until in another state’s airspace (of course, waiting this long to eat the food might give rise to a comparative negligence defense). By contrast, in Daimler, the plaintiffs were Argentines and one Chilean.
Had there been a California victim of abuse by a Daimler subsidiary in
South America (or by Daimler itself), the victim plaintiff may have been permitted to use general jurisdiction based on substantial business activity to forum shop to avoid a hostile foreign jurisdiction. Similarly, if plaintiffs had sued
Daimler in the MBUSA home states of Delaware or New Jersey, this may have
reduced the perceived unfairness of the situation. But perhaps not. The Court
clearly felt compelled to do some line drawing to prevent lower courts from
permitting what it regarded as outrageous exercises of personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs invoked the court’s general or all-purpose jurisdiction. California, they
urge, is a place where Daimler may be sued on any and all claims against it,
wherever in the world the claims may arise. For example, as plaintiffs’ counsel
affirmed, under [Plaintiffs’] proffered jurisdictional theory, if a Daimlermanufactured vehicle overturned in Poland, injuring a Polish driver and passenger, the injured parties could maintain a design defect suit in California. Exercises of personal jurisdiction so exorbitant, we hold, are barred by due process
constraints on the assertion of adjudicatory authority.179

Because of the unusual facts, foreign-centered allegations of wrongdoing,
and agency issues posed in the case,180 it is hard to be certain of Daimler’s
178

For example, consider a visiting American touring a facility in Germany who is negligently exposed to carcinogenic chemicals during the process. After returning to his home
state (a home state other than Delaware, where the defendant was incorporated or New Jersey, where the defendant was headquartered), plaintiff might understandably wish to pursue
his claim in his home state rather than traveling to Delaware or New Jersey (much less Germany). But pursuant to Daimler, the U.S. Supreme Court might well require this trip of
plaintiff, even without the agency and parent-subsidiary questions present in the actual
Daimler case.
179
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (citation omitted).
180
In essence, plaintiffs in Daimler were attempting, without first demonstrating alter ego
status, that a German parent company was responsible for a foreign subsidiary’s complicity
with an authoritarian regime related to the subsidiary’s suburban manufacturing facility (the
“incidents recounted in [plaintiffs’] complaint center on MB Argentina’s plant in Gonzalez
Catan, [outside of Buenos Aires] Argentina.” Id. at 751–52) on another continent, eight
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long-term impact on questions of general jurisdiction. But Goodyear and Daimler in combination give defense counsel substantial ammunition for fighting assertions of general personal jurisdiction. Both cases also serve as a cautionary
tale for counsel. By pushing too hard to expand the boundaries of general personal jurisdiction (to sue a European subsidiary of a U.S. company in North
Carolina [Goodyear]181 and to sue a European parent company in the U.S.
based on the American subsidiary for conduct by an Argentine subsidiary
[Daimler]), counsel produced precedents that appear to contract the potential
reach of general personal jurisdiction for litigants in the future.
The clear message of Goodyear and Daimler is that the Court (almost
unanimously) is resistant to broad exercises of general personal jurisdiction,
even as applied to some of the world’s largest companies. Although obtaining
general personal jurisdiction in the state of incorporation or managerial headquarters is certain, anything beyond that has become debatable in the wake of
these two cases, perhaps even for a U.S.-based company operating scores of
retail outlets in an adjacent state.182 Clearly the Court is concerned about subthousand miles from Daimler’s Stuttgart headquarters. One can understand the Court’s resistance to the concept, but it is resistance based not only on concerns about overbroad assertions of personal jurisdiction but also upon plaintiffs’ substantive theory of liability in the
case, as well as plaintiffs’ argument that a subsidiary’s pervasive contacts with the forum
state equated to the parent being vulnerable to suit in the forum state even over matters bearing no relation to the forum state. Because of the unusual posture of the case, Justice Sotomayor concurred in the result only. See id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). In particular, Justice Sotomayor found the majority opinion too sweeping as well as
unwisely moving away from the Court’s traditional “continuous and systematic” activity test
for general jurisdiction to one of whether the forum state sufficiently counts as the defendant’s “home.” In this way, she argued, a defendant with even a large amount of regular and
substantial activity in a state is not subject to general jurisdiction on the de facto ground that
the defendant’s base of operations is a more apt location. Daimler had conceded that
MBUSA was subject to general jurisdiction at the trial court level, which resulted in no significant discovery regarding parent Daimler’s general contact with California, which Justice
Sotomayor viewed as a problem because the Court had decided “the issue without a developed record.” Id. at 764–67.
181
But at least the Goodyear plaintiffs (parents of children killed in an accident occasioned
by an alleged tire defect) were from North Carolina. Daimler, however well intentioned as a
means of attacking human rights abuses, involved rather untethered forum shopping, perhaps
in defiance of logic. If Mercedes-Benz Argentina personnel were collaborating with a murderous regime in order to facilitate business in that country, would they really expose their
collaboration with an evil regime by reporting it to the parent company in Germany? And
would top management really bless such activity? Or would a reasonable factfinder conclude
that the German parent should have been aware of misconduct by the Argentine subsidiary,
or at least some employees of the Argentine subsidiary? It seems unlikely, but stranger and
more awful things have happened, which perhaps supports Justice Sotomayor’s view that
greater discovery was in order regarding Daimler’s connections to its subsidiaries.
182
Goodyear and Daimler leave open the question of what location constitutes corporate
headquarters, particularly in a world where technical legal status seems to diverge from reality regarding the locus of corporate activity. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Banks Cash In on
Mergers Intended to Elude Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2014, at B1, col. 1 (noting recent
trend motivated by tax avoidance in which U.S. companies become “headquartered” abroad
even though major operations generating profits are physically in the United States). This
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jecting even these well-heeled defendants (who can offload defense and settlement to insurers and in-house counsel or firms on retainer) to suit in states more
removed from core company operations or identity. Logically, then, the Court
should be similarly concerned about equally broad assertions of general jurisdiction over an individual with only passing physical presence in a state with
which the defendant has little or no contact.
D. Walden v. Fiore
In Walden v. Fiore,183 the Court continued the prevailing approach to specific jurisdiction. Like in Nicastro, the Court indicated that although obtaining
specific personal jurisdiction was easier than obtaining general jurisdiction,
there remain substantial limits on the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who has not been physically present in the forum state. The
case began when the eventual plaintiffs were stopped in the Atlanta airport and
questioned about the large amount of cash they carried. Plaintiffs responded
that they were professional gamblers returning from Puerto Rico with their recent winnings. Law enforcement officials were nonetheless sufficiently concerned about a possibly illegal source of the money, and they impounded the
cash. Plaintiffs continued on their journey home to Nevada, where they eventually obtained the return of the funds but sued for injuries. In particular, they
claimed that defendant Walden, a police officer from Covington, Georgia, deputized to work as a DEA agent at the airport, had made a knowingly false affidavit that had impeded and delayed the eventual return of the funds, causing
injury to plaintiffs in the forum state of Nevada.184
The Court found the asserted basis for specific personal jurisdiction to be
insufficient in that the defendant had not done enough that was sufficiently directed toward the forum state. It held that the defendant must be the one to create contact with the forum state and that those contacts must be with the forum
state itself, not merely with people who reside there.185 In this way, the Court
distinguished Officer Walden’s situation from that of the National Enquirer reporter in Calder v. Jones,186 who had worked on an allegedly defamatory article
about a California-based actress from Florida but had made numerous telephone contacts to California as part of writing the article. In addition, the impact of the article in Calder was felt in California, where it was read by Californians, whereas the harm done to the Fiore plaintiffs was more confined in
and similar developments regarding corporate organizational form, many of which post-date
Professor Twitchell’s influential article (Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 52), suggest that it would be unwise to restrict general jurisdiction to only locations of incorporation
or main headquarters and that general jurisdiction also should properly lie in any state where
an entity defendant has nontrivial continuous and systematic presence.
183
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
184
Id. at 1120.
185
Id. at 1122.
186
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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impact187 (although clearly more acute to them than the impact on readers of a
defamatory story). Viewed as a whole, the defendant simply lacked sufficient
minimum contacts with Nevada to make a Nevada court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him consistent with fair play and substantial justice.188
Notwithstanding the parameters of Nicastro and Fiore, courts have upheld
specific personal jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant injecting its goods
into the “stream of commerce” with clear intent to serve markets in the forum
state.189 Courts have also allowed suit to proceed when the defendant was engaging in conduct that had distinctly targeted the forum state or had reasonably
foreseeable effects in the forum state.190 Similarly, where a defendant from another jurisdiction has intentionally hacked into a computer system in the forum
state, personal jurisdiction has been found for an action arising out of misappropriation of trade secrets facilitated by the hacking.191 Thus, although litigators should take note of the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions arguably
constricting specific personal jurisdiction, any such shift appears modest, with
courts continuing to permit generally expansive exercises of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants causing injury to plaintiffs in the forum
state.192 In contrast to Goodyear, Nicastro, and Daimler, Fiore appears to have
been met with a collective yawn by commentators, with little criticism.193
187

Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–25.
Id. at 1126.
189
See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2013). But see Kason
Indus., Inc. v. Dent Design Hardware, Ltd., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (plaintiff’s failure to aver any patent infringement by defendant in forum state; also no general jurisdiction because plaintiff averred no defendant incorporation, headquarters, or other substantial presence in forum state; mere sales, even if extensive, insufficient to confer general
personal jurisdiction).
190
See, e.g., Wash. Shoe Co. v. A–Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2012)
(Arkansas corporation could be sued for copyright infringement in Washington, where the
state copyright holder was located, even when defendant had no other contact with Washington, because infringement had impact in Washington).
191
See MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2012) (Canadian employee’s use
of Connecticut employer’s computer system, which had server physically located in Connecticut, was sufficient minimum contacts to support specific personal jurisdiction). However, a Canadian broker who was providing services through the conventional means of telephone and mail and directing shipments of goods that entered the state but were not directly
shipped and who had never visited Missouri was found not to be subject to personal jurisdiction there. See Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. v. Bassett & Walker Int’l, Inc., 702 F.3d 472 (8th
Cir. 2012).
192
Regarding general jurisdiction, the combination of Goodyear and Daimler is likely to
provide more support for dismissal motions that the more modest narrowing of the specific
jurisdiction concept reflected in Nicastro and Walden v. Fiore. Compare Sonera Holding
B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting application of general jurisdiction over large Turkish conglomerate doing substantial business in the U.S. because defendant is not “essentially at home” in the U.S. within the meaning of Goodyear and
Daimler) with In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F.3d 576 (5th
Cir. 2014) (holding specific jurisdiction proper in Virginia over Chinese manufacturer of
allegedly defective building materials; defendant purposefully availed itself of benefits of
doing business in forum state by directly selling to builders); Beverage v. Pullman & Com188
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CONCLUSION: TIME TO END TO THE MYTH AND CURRENT FRAGMENTED
PERSONAL JURISDICTION METHODOLOGY
To again invoke a Holmes aphorism, “a page of history is worth a volume
of logic.”194 Nonetheless, one would have thought that tag jurisdiction could
not survive after International Shoe replaced territorial hegemony with a personal jurisdiction inquiry based on reasonable and fair connection between the
defendants, the forum, and the action. One would have reasonably felt even
more confident about this after Shaffer v. Heitner subjected quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to minimum contacts analysis and drastically reduced its availability,
utility, and role in modern litigation.
But history, tradition, inertia, and confusion have combined to maintain tag
jurisdiction long after it should have died. Like Holmes’ clavicle of the cat, tag
jurisdiction, whatever its benefits in the pre-industrial world, survived without
any significant evolution of its function and became unnecessary for legitimate
exercises of personal jurisdiction but available for misuse. It remains largely a
means for ambushing opponents in seeking to gain a tactical geographic or doctrinal advantage over a defendant who could not otherwise satisfy the minimum
contacts requirement for suit in plaintiff’s chosen forum state.
Perhaps more troubling is that tag jurisdiction is a form of ambush that can
be inflicted upon individual defendants—including those most likely to be
harmed by facing litigation in a distant, inconvenient, or hostile forum—but not
upon corporate entities, even though most such entities are in a far better position for defending claims.
Like something from a bad zombie movie, tag jurisdiction survives. It
showed resilience in the lower courts after International Shoe and Shaffer v.
Heitner, and then it received surprising support from nearly half the Supreme
Court in Burnham.195 An odd diffusion of legal misinformation then created a
mythology that increased the precedential influence of Burnham far beyond the
parameters of the Court’s opinion and in apparent defiance of weak argument
favoring continued use of pure tag jurisdiction.196
Although perhaps not as mythic as some cases or topics, the Burnham mythology has been equally or more irrepressible.197 Ask the average lawyer or
judge today (and perhaps even the average law professor) whether tag jurisdicley, LLC, 316 P.3d 590 (Ariz. 2014) (upholding exercise of specific jurisdiction over Connecticut lawyer and law firm based on provision of opinion letter regarding tax-shelter to
Arizona residents).
193
For example, in the wake of the Walden v. Fiore decision, a string of emails on the
AALS Civil Procedure listserve contained roughly forty comments about the case, none particularly negative and most characterizing the decision as consistent with prevailing precedent on specific personal jurisdiction. Academic commentary on Walden v. Fiore to date has
been largely descriptive and not critical, in contrast to scholarly assessments of the other
three cases.
194
N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
195
See supra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.
196
See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text.
197
See supra note * (sources using “irrepressible” mythology analysis).
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tion based on service alone—even for the defendant with no other contacts
aside from merely passing through (or over) the forum state—is constitutional
and almost all will agree, with most referencing the three-justice Scalia opinion
in Burnham, even if they cannot remember the case by name. As discussed
above, Burnham’s mythic status is undeserved and it cannot fairly be said to
have validated tag jurisdiction. But even without benefit of an overbroad reading of Burnham, lower courts were already applying tag jurisdiction inappropriately in cases such as Grace v. MacArthur.198
Tag jurisdiction and the Burnham Court’s failure to invalidate or tame it in
the manner that Shaffer tamed quasi-in-rem jurisdiction has long been a bit of
an embarrassment to a legal system that prides itself on rationality, consistency,
and even fairness—particularly fairness to absent defendants. The Court’s latest
decisions in Goodyear, Nicastro, Daimler, and Walden v. Fiore—all of which
should cause great unease for fairness to the defendant, particularly concerning
attempted exercise of general jurisdiction—have made pure tag jurisdiction and
the Scalia position even more indefensible.199
Some courts continue to uphold tag jurisdiction even though it is inconsistent with a defendant-centered due process emphasis on the ground that International Shoe, notwithstanding its shift from a territorial focus to a due process focus, was nonetheless an opinion that expanded jurisdiction as a practical
matter. In particular, jurisdiction over nonresident, non-domiciliary corporations was expanded based on their business activity directed toward the state, at
least if the claim had a sufficient connection to that business activity. Most of
the post-International Shoe cases on jurisdiction (e.g., McGee, Burger King,
Calder v. Jones, Keeton v. Hustler) can be fitted to this view.200
Although World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi Metal constrict jurisdiction,
the former can be explained as protecting local retailers from unfair exercises
of personal jurisdiction in a distant forum based merely on the mobility of the
products they sell locally. Moreover, the latter can be explained by the attenuated connection between the defendant and the forum state by the absence of
any significant U.S. interest in the dispute once the American plaintiff’s claim
was resolved, leaving only an indemnity action between a Taiwanese tire company and a Japanese air valve maker.201
But with Nicastro, the Court arguably took a significant step back from expansive exercises of jurisdiction over a nonresident company. Defendant McIntyre was voluntarily operating in the United States with the intent of putting its
products in states like New Jersey, where the underlying claim arose, even if
McIntyre’s marketing had not specifically targeted New Jersey. The Court
198

See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the surprising notoriety of and support for MacArthur,
despite being clearly erroneous under an International Shoe analysis and arguably incorrect
under a Pennoyer territoriality analysis as well).
199
See supra Part III (discussing recent Supreme Court cases and their inconsistency with
continued use of tag jurisdiction).
200
See supra notes 7–16, 51–52 and accompanying text (reviewing modern personal jurisdiction precedent).
201
See supra note 55 (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi Metal).
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nonetheless prevented the state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over this defendant clearly doing business in the United States and trying to reach states
like New Jersey.202
Regarding the issue of defendant convenience, although New Jersey is a
long way from England, it is considerably closer than Las Vegas and other
parts of the United States where McIntyre had been happy to travel in search of
sales. Further, the Nicastro Court appeared never to consider the practicalities
of litigation by a domestic individual against a foreign corporation, especially
one located some distance from the United States. If forced to defend on the
merits in New Jersey, McIntyre would in all likelihood simply obtain a defense
from its liability insurer, which would also provide coverage for any judgments
against McIntyre. In all likelihood, McIntyre’s challenge to personal jurisdiction was funded by its liability insurer. Under such circumstances, concerns
about the “unfairness” of an insured corporate defendant facing suit outside its
home state seem overwrought.
For a number of reasons, Nicastro provides rather substantial protection for
businesses seeking to avoid specific personal jurisdiction. By contrast, an individual accosted via service of process while temporarily in a forum receives no
judicial scrutiny of the fairness or reasonableness of such exercises of jurisdiction. Although the disconnect between the Court’s modern specific jurisdiction
cases and tag jurisdiction is bad enough, the Court’s recent general jurisdiction
cases of Goodyear and Daimler create an even more problematic gap between
the Court’s treatment of businesses best able to respond to suits away from
home and the Court’s lack of sympathy for the “tagged” transient defendant.203
Too often overlooked in discussions of transient jurisdiction is that it (1)
operates in the nature of general jurisdiction but (2) only applies to natural persons. Once tagged, the transient defendant can be sued in the state of service for
anything. But only individuals can be tagged.204 Efforts to establish personal
jurisdiction over an entity by personal service upon even a high ranking officer,
director, or employee of a company is almost universally held to be ineffective
to establish personal jurisdiction over the entity, even if the claim arises out of
entity activity in the forum state. In effect, the American legal system currently
gives corporate and other entity defendants a universal right to argue fairness,
reasonableness, and due process, but it denies that same right to individuals
tagged with personal service while in transit.
202

See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text (discussing Nicastro).
See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text (discussing Goodyear) and supra notes
171–82 and accompanying text (discussing Daimler).
204
In some cases natural persons with designated agency status can be served and this will
be effective to establish jurisdiction over the entity. Many long-arm statutes, which provide
that the company designates the Secretary of State or another government official to be the
agent for service, could be construed in this way. But—importantly—even if the entity’s
agent is served in the forum state, the entity is normally permitted to contest jurisdiction pursuant to an International Shoe analysis. And Shaffer v. Heitner clearly protects entities
against the possibility that they will be “held up” by plaintiffs attaching their forum state
property as part of an exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.
203
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Pursuant to Goodyear and Daimler, a business defendant with vast operations within a state can argue that it need only face lawsuits in that state related
to those operations or related to the underlying lawsuit. Certainly, sales alone in
the forum state are not sufficient to support an exercise of general personal jurisdiction. Goodyear and particularly Daimler were quite specific on that point.
Even if subsequent decisions treat other business operations (e.g., retail
outlets, warehouses, distribution networks) as supporting general jurisdiction,
when sales alone would not, the Supreme Court has now created a world in
which the largest, wealthiest litigants, who are most readily able to defend
themselves, receive substantial due process empathy from the Court, while
transient individuals receive almost none. To the extent that subsequent decisions read Daimler and Goodyear as permitting general jurisdiction over a
company only in the states of corporate domicile and company headquarters,
the inequitable treatment of human beings and entities becomes so pronounced
as to invite ridicule.
For roughly three decades, commentators have consistently criticized the
Supreme Court’s work in the area of personal jurisdiction as producing unhelpful, inconsistent, and unnecessary precedents.205 Goodyear, Nicastro, and
Daimler have only given more support to the already well-supplied critics. In
view of the profession’s general dissatisfaction with the law in this area and the
increasingly inequitable and anachronistic presence of transient jurisdiction, the
time is ripe for reviving proposals for a more unitary approach to jurisdiction.
Such an approach would likely not differentiate between modes of establishing
the jurisdiction and whether it is deemed general or specific.
Over the past sixty years, scholars have suggested such a unitary approach—one in which fairness and reasonableness analysis was front-andcenter in a due process/minimum contacts analysis applicable to all cases.206 A
205

For a particularly pithy summary written prior to the Court’s most recent forays into the
area (which in my view have exacerbated rather than alleviated the problems noted by the
author) see Borchers, supra note 155:
The Court has held that a corporate trustee can get jurisdiction over the beneficiaries in the
trustee’s home state, but not vice versa. Child support claimants are not necessarily entitled to
litigate the support issue in their own state, unless, of course, they manage to tag the defendant
while she passes through the state. A shareholder wishing to sue a large corporation’s directors
for bad corporate management is not necessarily entitled to litigate in the state of incorporation,
but a large corporation can drag one of its nickel-and-dime franchisees to the corporation’s home
state. Products liability suits almost always require more than one suit if the plaintiff wants to
sue all of the defendants in the chain of distribution. American plaintiffs suing foreign defendants are not necessarily entitled to an American forum, even if the defendant purchases the instrument of injury in America. Plaintiffs in actions for defamation, a constitutionally regulated
and supposedly disfavored tort, can pick and choose among forums, but other tort plaintiffs cannot. Purely fictional factors, such as whether the forum state has enacted a “special” jurisdictional statute, count heavily, but practical factors, such as the fact that the defense is being conducted
by the insurer, count for nothing.

Id. at 101–02 (footnotes omitted) (concluding that this state of affairs suggests the Court has
not been doing “serious adult effort” regarding personal jurisdiction).
206
See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 40 (focus of personal jurisdiction inquiry should be
reasonable convenience for defendant and other parties in light of the litigation); Harold S.
Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform
Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1984) (arguing for determination of jurisdiction based on
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full review of such proposals is beyond the scope of this article, but such an approach seems an obvious antidote to the increasing tension between restrictions
upon personal jurisdiction over corporations but continued use of tag general
personal jurisdiction over individuals. The reform proposals are largely consistent and generally devolve to the following concept that I propose be used in
place of the current splintered approach to personal jurisdiction:
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant (individual or entity)
should depend upon whether the defendant has adequate notice and opportunity
to be heard in a forum that is fair and reasonable in light of the defendant’s connection to the forum, with due consideration also given to the burdens on the defendant and the forum’s connection to the plaintiff, the litigation, and other interested persons or entities, as well as the practicalities of litigation in the forum
state and the availability of alternative forums.

To be sure, the outcomes of cases applying this standard will vary according to both the facts of the case and the sensibilities of the particular bench ruling on the personal jurisdiction dispute. But such variance already occurs under
the supposedly more precise but operationally more confused structure that the
Court has erected during the past thirty-five years. It is hard to imagine any
more disjointed or disappointing results using the simplified and unified standard set forth above, or any of the similar variants suggested by wiser commentators over the years.
Adopting this type of unified approach to questions of personal jurisdiction
would make the distinctions between general and specific jurisdiction unnecessary, provide greater uniformity in the treatment of individual and entity defendants, and reduce unfairness. This methodology would still take a broad approach to jurisdiction and even permit the use of expansive exercises of
jurisdiction where warranted to provide a forum for resolving disputes and rendering relief.
Consistently taking this sort of unified and due process-centered approach
would also likely have at least one very tangible benefit: it would almost certainly strike down the use of pure tag jurisdiction, save in special circumstances, and terminate the irrepressible myth of Burnham. Rather than accepting tag
jurisdiction as a given, it would largely bar the practice except when thought
necessary to prevent a defendant from escaping the reach of the rule of law.

defendant expectations and benefits received by defendant through forum state activity);
Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 74 (suggesting that personal jurisdiction be based on
fairness, convenience, and efficiency); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 52, at 782–83
(although continuing to preserve distinction between specific and general personal jurisdiction, emphasizing “legitimate exercise of power by sovereign states” over defendant as metric for assessing reasonableness of exercise of jurisdiction); Wasserman, supra note 82 (indirectly suggesting that all exercises of personal jurisdiction should be assessed according to
defendant, fairness, and convenience in light of specific case).
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